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Finley: The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Brave New World of Retirement Sec

PAPER PREPARED BY STUDENTS IN THE
UNDERGRADUATE LAW PROGRAM
THE PENSION REFORM ACT OF 1974:
BRAVE NEW WORLD OF RETIREMENT SECURITY'
For many Americans, old age is a time of uncertainties and fears, the worst
of which may be the fear of poverty after retirement. Fortunately, such
fears have begun to abate in recent years, largely because of society's recognition that care for the elderly is a group responsibility. Social Security, and
Medicare 2 are two examples of a congressional attempt to implement this
concept on a national level. The most recent effort, signed into law on
Labor Day, 1974, represents the most sweeping pension reform in this
country's history - the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.3
More popularly known as the Pension Reform Act (PRA), this enactment comes 99 years after the establishment of the first private industrial
pension plan. 4 Through the intervening years, pension plans have been
subject to numerous improprieties because of the lack of effective regulation over their tremendous assets. The Act is a culmination of 14 years
of study5 and represents a determined congressional reaction to such notorious
abuses as fiduciary malfeasance, actuarial incompetence, and inequitable
forfeiture of pension benefits. It preempts, with minor qualification, all state
law relating to employee benefit plansr and will necessitate massive revision
of the vast majority of private pension programs.
This note considers the historical forces leading to the enactment of
the PRA and its operation in light of Congress' purported aim-to assure
"the equitable character of [pension] plans and their financial soundness."8
Special emphasis is given to the subjects of participation, vesting, benefit
accrual, funding, and the new provisions for individual retirement accounts.
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the winter 1975 quarter.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§301 et seq. (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§1395 et seq. (1970).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406 (Sept. 2, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Act].
4. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, PENSION PLANNING 1 (1966). The first plan was established by
the American Express Company. Id.
5. Serious discussion of comprehensive pension reform began as early as the 86th Congress. Lindquist, The Pension Remodeling Act of 1974, 52 TAXES 873 (1974). In March 1962,
President John F. Kennedy appointed a private pension study committee, which published

its report in 1965.
TIREMENT AND

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON

WVELFARE PROGRAMS,

CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIvATE RE-

PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION

PROGRAMS,

A

REPORT

(1965).
6. Act §514. The Act will not preempt state insurance, banking, and securities laws. Act
§514(b)(2)(A).
7. Childs, 1974 Pension Reform Law Treatment of Participation,Coverage and Distribution, 52 TAXES 864 (1974). See generally FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 78.

TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE PLANS

8. Act §2(a).
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No attempt is made to treat the topic of pensions exhaustively, for that is
clearly impossible in a single law review note. Rather, an attempt is made
to highlight the important features and thereby present a broad picture of
where private pension law has been and where it is heading.
THE RISE OF PENSIONS

Although the beginnings of private pensions date back to the 1800's, 9
these programs did not become widespread until after World War IIY°
This slow rate of growth was due to the fact that the early plans were confined mainly to railroads, banks, and public utilities."1 Most manufacturing
companies, still relatively young at the turn of the century, were not confronted with the problems of superannuation faced by these other industries.
Indeed, as recently as 1940, fewer than one-fifth of all employees in com2
merce and industry - or about 4.26 million -- participated in pension plans.'
Moreover, total assets and reserve in that year were a relatively insignificant
$2.4 billion. 3
In contrast, plan assets are currently estimated to be about $154 billion
and are projected to reach $225 billion by 1980.'4 Private programs presently
cover approximately 34 million wage and salaried workers,15 and tax concessions allowed such plans account for a $4 billion annual revenue loss to the
federal government. 6 "Of all the social claims that have piled up at the
doorstep of the American system in recent times, few entail such sharply
rising costs as private pensions," the unfunded obligations of which "represent
17
one-quarter to one-third of the net worth of scores of large companies."'
Among sizable corporations, payments to pension funds devour the equivalent
of 20 percent of pre-tax earnings and the proportion is projected to increase
further.'
No single element can be isolated as the underlying cause for this
spectacular growth of private pensions. Certainly, by institutionalizing and
augmenting the concept of an employee's right to retirement benefits, Social
Security provided one catalyst for the expansion of such plans. 9 Likewise,
9. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
10. See J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 2.

11. Id. at 1.
12.
STATES
13.
14.
15.

INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PENSION PLANS IN THE UNITED

3 (n.d.).
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1974).
R. NADER : K. BLAcKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 5 (1973).

16. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1974).
17. FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 78.
18. Id.
19. Between 1935 and 1973, the number of workers covered by private plans increased
twelvefold. Compare J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 2, with R. NADER & K. BLACxWELL, supra note 15, at 5. Plan assets have grown during the same period in excess of one
hundredfold. Compare J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 2, with H.R. REP. No. 93-807,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1974).
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increased longevity20 and the postwar economic boom

21

[Vol. XXVII

added greatly to

both the need and the means for such programs. Other factors, however,
have contributed as well. Labor unions, relatively insignificant during the
early history of pension planning, have blossomed since the 1930's,22 adding
2
impetus to the growing demands for retirement security. 3 Increased urbanization and the relaxation of family ties, combined with compulsory retirement
at age 60 or 65, created a situation in which the elderly, ejected from the
work force and unable to fall back on the traditional bonds of land and
family, looked more and more to private pensions. But perhaps the most
significant reason for the growth of industrial pension programs
employers' own self-interest. Major tax incentives were created that
2
full deductions for contributions to pension funds. 4 In addition, a
could be used to attract and retain valued employees until such

was

the

allowed
pension
time as

they were no longer productive, and then to induce their voluntary retirement.2 5 In sum, private pensions could be used to serve employees, employers,
and society all at the same time. Thus, they have evolved as an essential
component, along with Social Security and individual savings, in the tripartite
key to retirement security.23
A PENSION PRIMER
An appreciation of the Pension Reform Act requires an acquaintance
2
with the basic workings of pensions. A pension plan 7 may be broadly de20. The number of Americans over the age of 65 increased from 3.1 million in 1900,
to 9 million by 1940, and to more than 20 million by 1970. READER'S DIGEST, 1973 ALMANAC
AND YEARBOOK 368. This figure is projected to exceed 29 million by the year 2000. Id.
21. R. NADER 9: K. BLACKWELL, supra note 15, at 15.
22. Union membership has grown from 3.5 million in 1929, to 7 million in 1937, to over
20 million in 1970. R. SIITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 31, 41, 52
(1974).
23. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 10-12.
24. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
25. M. BERNSTEIN, TItE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10 (1964); J. MELONE & E. ALLEN,
supra note 4, at 7-9.
26. Siegfried, The Role of Private Pensions, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTERSs 7, 9 (1970); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans of the Senate
Comm. on Finance,93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1265 (1973).
27. Pension plans should be distinguished from two other forms of deferred compensation: profit sharing plans and stock bonus plans. In a profit sharing plan, contributions are
made from the profits of the employer, and the amount may be left to the employer's
discretion. For example, such a plan may provide that each year the board of directors of
the employer will determine the amount to be contributed. L. Lokken, Teaching Materials
in Deferred Compensation 132 (1974) (unpublished manuscript, University of Florida Law
School Library). See also J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 287-88.
"The distinguishing feature of a stock bonus plan is that all distributions to employees
are in stock of the employer corporation. As in the case of a profit sharing plan the employer may retain the discretion to determine yearly the amount of its contribution to the
plan," L. Lokken, supra at 53, although the contribution is not necessarily dependent on
profits. "The requirement that all distributions be in employer stock is inflexible. ...
[Consequently] [s]tock bonus plans are relatively rare." Id. See also TREAS. REG. §1.401-1(b)(2)
(iii).
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fined as an arrangement between an employer and his employees 28 for the
establishment and maintenance of a fund that provides retirement income
for the employees.2 9 While there are almost limitless permutations of these
plans, they generally may be categorized as either defined benefit or defined
contribution plans.
A defined benefit plan establishes a fixed benefit for each employee, usually based on one of four benefit formulas.30 Consequently, under a given
formula, the amount the employer contributes3- will be that portion of
32
the defined benefit actuarially calculated to produce the desired pension.
Conversely, a defined contribution, or money purchase, plan fixes the rate
of contribution by the employer,3 3 and the amount of the benefit varies in
relation to, for example, shifts in the figure to which that rate is applied,
4
such as the employee's salary.A
28. While there are other types of pension plans, such as those established by unions or
fraternal organizations, and governmental plans, this note deals only with those established
by private employers.
29. Other employee welfare plans often provide health care, insurance, disability payments, or other benefits not directly related to retirement income. These are not considered
pension plans and are not within the scope of this note.
30. These formulas include: "(1) a flat amount formula which provides a flat benefit unrelated to an employee's earnings or service [e.g., $75 a month to begin at retirement]; (2) a
flat percentage of earnings formula which provides a benefit related to the employee's earnings but which does not reflect his service [e.g., 20% of annual salary or 20% of career
average salary. Obviously, under this formula, employer contributions will have to be recalculated after each employee raise to reflect the increased pension resulting from a larger
multiplicand]; (3) a flat amount per year of service formula which reflects an employee's
service but not his earnings [e.g., $5 a month for each year of service]; and (4) a percentage
of earnings per year of service formula which reflects both an employee's earnings and his
service [e.g., 1% of career earnings for each year of service]." J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra
note 4, at 57.
It should be noted that upon establishment of a plan, an employer may choose to apply
its benefits retroactively to current employees with prior service accumulations. This decision would produce "prior service costs" that would have to be accounted for in determining contributions so as to assure a defined benefit.
31. In the context of pensions, "contribute" means "pay." Op. No. 8-Accounting for
the Cost of Pension Plans (1966), 2 ACCOUNTING PuNciPI.rEs BuLL. 6539, 6554 (1971).
32. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 33. These determinations are based on
actuarial assumptions and valuations, taking into consideration such factors as employees'
ages and salaries, employee turnover, and anticipated return on the pension fund's investments. Id. ch. 4.
33. Id. at 33. A typical defined contribution plan would require an employer to make an
annual contribution of either a flat amount or a certain percentage of each employee's
compensation. It might alternatively require the contribution of a certain amount for a
given number of units of production, e.g., 900 per ton of steel. A separate account would be
set up for each employee, which would be credited with his allocated share of employer
contributions and earnings on the fund's investments. At retirement, the total amount in an
employee's individual account would be used to provide his benefit, often through the
purchase of an annuity contract.
34. Other factors resulting in variation of benefits might include length of service at
retirement (the longer the service, the more contributions that have been made and the
higher the benefits), the cost of an annuity contract at retirement (if investments at that
particular time are bringing lower returns, the same amount of money will purchase de-
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Pensions differ according to whether the employees contribute any part
of the cost. Thus, a contributory plan may allow or even require employees
to contribute, 3 5 while a noncontributory plan is financed entirely by the
employer. Another means of classification is based on whether the plan is
funded or unfunded. Funded plans provide for the gradual accumulation of
assets, generally in a trust., to meet future demands. 36 On the other hand,
unfunded plans are operated on a "pay as you go" basis whereby the employer contributes only those benefits actually due and makes no provision
37

for future liabilities.

Typically, pension plans require a minimum period of employment with
the company or the attainment of a minimum age, or both, before an employee may participate in, or become a member of, a plan. 38 When an employee meets these eligibility requirements, his participation, or member-ship, in the plan begins and, in the case of a funded plan, the employer
starts to make contributions for his benefit. During the employee's years of
participation, his pension benefits accrue gradually. In effect, the employee
is earning a small part of his pension each year. The annual rate at which
this eventual retirement benefit accumulates is the benefit accrual rate.39 For
example, a plan might provide for a benefit accrual rate of three percent
each year. Thus, during each year, the employee would be credited with an
additional three percent of his pension. After ten years he would have accrued
30 percent of his normal retirement benefit and would accrue 100 percent
after 33 1/3 years.
The accrued benefits become vested,,40 or nonforfeitable, at some point
in his participation. Some plans provide for 100 percent vesting after a
certain number of years of service; others provide for graduated vesting
schedules. Still others defer vesting altogether until the employee retires
at the normal retirement age. When an employee is fully vested, his accrued
41
benefit is nonforfeitable, regardless of future employment.
creased benefits) and the retiree's age or sex (if a particular individual's life expectancy is
relatively long, his annual benefits will be correspondingly decreased).
35. Contributory plans usually contain a provision whereby the employer's contributions
are proportional to the employee's contributions. Where such contributions are mandatory
rather than voluntary, the employee who does not contribute is not entitled to any pension
benefits, and the employer contributes nothing toward his retirement. Where the plan allows
for voluntary contributions, the employee often may allot up to approximately 10% of his
compensation to the pension fund, but if he elects not to contribute, the employer still pays
some minimum amount toward his retirement. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 58-59.
36. Funded plans utiliLe an) of several actuarial cost methods, only some of which are
approved by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. For a concise discussion
of this area, see Op. No. 8, supra note 31, at 6539.
37. Id. at 6555. "Pay as you go" is not an acceptable cost accounting method in the
opinion of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Id.
38. See text accompanying notes 154-189 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 192-207 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 208-228 infra.
41. At first blush, the dual schedules (i.e., accrual rate and vesting rate) for determining
an employee's nonforfeitable right to a given pension benefits seem superfluous. An employee
who is first told that he has eaned or accrued X dollars but then informed that he only
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To illustrate these concepts, assume that in 1965 the ABC Company established and began to fund a noncontributory defined benefit plan providing for a pension equal to 50 percent of the employee's average annual
rate of compensation. To be eligible to participate, an employee must have
worked for ABC for two years. The benefit accrual rate is three percent
a year. Full vesting occurs after 25 years - 50 percent after 15 years with an
additional five percent vesting during each of the next 10 years. The employee must retire when he reaches age 65, at which time he will begin to
collect his pension.
Employee Jones went to work for ABC in 1955, when he was 30. In 1975
he earns $12,000. His normal retirement benefit would be 50 percent of
$12,000, or 56,000 each year. His accrued benefit would be three percent
of that amount multiplied by 20 years, or $3,600. Since the vesting schedule
requires 25 years for his accrued benefit to become fully vested, however, he
does not have an enforceable right to the $3,600. Rather, he is 75 percent
vested -50 percent after the first 15 years, plus five percent times five years. In
other words, if Jones were to resign in 1975, he would receive only $2,700 a
year, or 75 percent of 60 percent of his normal retirement benefit, and. that
would not become payable until 1990, when he reached age 65.
ABC would, of course, have to contribute enough money to the pension
trust over the years to provide Jones' retirement benefit. In 1965 when the
plan was adopted, he would have already accrued 30 percent of his pension.
That 30 percent would be part of the plan's past service cost and, depending
upon the funding method selected, ABC's contributions for 1965 and subsequent years would include either interest on the amount of unfunded
liability42 or an amount in partial amortization of that liability. ABC would
also pay each year the portion of eventual pension benefits arising from employees' service in that year.
In contrast to the complexities involved in ABC's defined benefit plan,
the XYZ Company in 1965 adopted a defined contribution plan that prohas a right to 1h X dollars might feel somewhat.bewildered and perhaps even cheated. His
natural reaction might be that, at least for the sake of simplicity, there should be only one
determinative schedule. While this attitude is understandable, there are arguably valid
reasons for the application of two formulas. A basic accrual rate will,.of course, always be
necessary so as to provide the employer with a steady accretion of pension liabilities and
thereby prevent the costly bunching of such liabilities in any one year. Moreover, an
incremental accrual rate reflects the fact that an employee is earning only part of his
eventual pension benefit each year. On the other hand, a vesting schedule is a device with
which to restrict employee turnover and insure loyalty by threatening the forfeiture of all
or part of the worker's accrued benefits should he decide to change jobs. While this concept
raises serious policy considerations (e.g., whether an employer should be allowed to restrict
labor mobility while receiving tax subsidies, or whether an employer should be required to
bestow a pension on every employee who comes through his shop), the accounting that
would be required to merge the underlying principles of a vesting schedule with those of an
accrual schedule would make any hybrid formula more, rather than less, complicated.
42. While paying only the interest on past service costs would merely keep those liabilities from getting larger and do nothing to decrease their size, this was all that was required
under prior tax law. TREAs. RaE. §lA01-6(c)(2)(ii); H.R. RaP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
73 (1974). See text accompanying notes 240-246 infra.
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vides for a retirement annuity. Each year XYZ contributes to its pension trust
an amount equal to three percent of each employee's salary for that year.
The XYZ plan has the same two-year participation requirement and the
same normal retirement age but provides for full vesting after 10 years of
participation. Employee Smith began working for XYZ in 1955 at the age
of 30 and was therefore eligible to participate when the plan was adopted
in 1965. Smith also earns $12,000 a year, so each year XYZ contributes $360three percent of $12,000 - to the trust for him. Smith's accrued benefit is
simply the balance in his account; that is, the amount of XYZ's contributions
plus all investment income allocated to him. After the requisite ten years, the
entire amount in his account, $3,600 plus interest, is completely vested.
Should Smith resign in 1975, that amount would be used to purchase an
annuity contract for him, with payments to begin in

1990.

4

3

In view of the relative simplicity of defined contribution plans, the
more technical sections of this note consider the most common kind of
pension coverage: funded, noncontributory, defined benefit plans. 44 Unless
otherwise indicated, the PRA provisions discussed may not be applicable to
other varieties of pensions.
THE NEED FOR REFORM

Tax Law
Recognizing the desirability of private pensions, Congress has used tax
subsidies since 192645 as a means of encouraging employers to set up retire43. Plans often provide for early retirement with reduced benefits. Compare note 196
infra.
44. This statement must be qualified: while defined contribution plans are more
numerous, defined benefit plans cover more employees. There are numerous reasons for
the prevalence of funded, noncontributory, defined benefit plans. Funded plans allow the
smallest outlay of contributions for each employee because payments in early years will
earn interest until the employee retires. Also, funded plans provide the greatest retirement
security for employees. Should the employer using an unfunded plan become insolvent, all
pensions would be severely curtailed or eliminated altogether. Where a plan is fully funded,
however, employer insolvency will have no effect on accrued benefits. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN,
supra note 4, at 75-79.
With respect to employee contributions, most plans are noncontributory because employee contributions must alway,, be made with after-tax dollars while employer contributions involve before-tax dollars. Thus, it is much more economical for the employer to
simply pay a proportionately lower wage and contribute to a plan without such payments
being subject to reduction because of tax liability. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 217-21.
The abundance of defined benefit plans is attributable to the fact that, in contrast to
defined contribution plans, investment risks are borne by the employer, not the employee.
It will be remembered that defined contribution plans fix employer contributions but benefits vary, in part because of variations in investment yields. Under a defined benefit
plan, however, the benefits are fixed and any discrepancy in investment returns must be
accounted for through increases or decreases of employer contributions. Because retirement
security is an important aspect of deferred compensation, most rank-and-file workers prefer
defined benefits. L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 54.
45. R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 15, at 15.
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ment plans for their employees. Until 1942, in effect, three basic tax breaks
were extended to all pension trusts. 46 First, employers could deduct their
contributions when they were made. 47 In addition, the income earned on the
accumulated contributions was exempt from taxation.48 Finally, the amounts
contributed were not currently taxable to the employees; 49 their tax liability
arose only as they actually received the benefits after retirement. Because
pension income was usually less than the pensioners' earnings during their
working years, the payments were taxed at lower marginal rates.
Unfortunately, however, Congress' plan did not always work to the benefit
of those employees for whom it was intended. High-ranking corporate officers
often set up pension plans for themselves and excluded all other employees
from participation.- o As a result, the Treasury Department urged amendments to the tax provisions that would have been "so strict ... as to disallow
the favorable tax treatment for the great bulk for [sic] even the bona fide
5
pension plans."s1
Unwilling to abolish the privileges granted to bona fide
pension plans and equally unwilling to permit further abuse of those
privileges, Congress responded in 1942 with something in the nature of a
compromise5 2 - the "qualified" pension plan. 53 To retain the tax benefits
of earlier law, plans had to be broadened in their coverage so as not to discriminate in favor of officers, stockholders, or highly paid employees. 54 There
were also other qualification requirements, many of which were the same
as under the pre-1942 tax provisions. A pension plan had to funnel con46. J. SEIDMAN, 1 SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFIrs
TAX LAws - 1953-1939, at 1377 (1954).
47. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23(p).
48. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §165(a).
49. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §165(b).
50. J. SEMIMAN, supra note 46, at 1385.
51. Id., citing 88 CONG. REC. 6378 (1942) (remarks of Representative Disney).
52. Id.
53. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§23(p), 165 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§401-04).
54. The statute sets out a rule of thumb: a plan is considered not to discriminate in
coverage if at least 70% of all employees with 5 years of service participate, or if 70% are
eligible and 80% of the eligible employees actually participate. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§165(a) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §401(a)(3)). This standard is stated in terms of alternatives primarily to encompass both contributory and noncontributory plans. For example, a
plan could have eligibility requirements that would permit 70% of the employees to participate but also require employee contributions of a certain amount of salary. If the contribution were so burdensome that only the highly paid employees would be willing to
participate, the plan would be discriminatory in fact. See Rev. Rul. 72-58, 1972-1 CUM. BULL.
111. To guard against this sort of hidden discrimination, the Internal Revenue Code contains the "80% of 70%" formula. If 80% of the eligible employees actually participate, the
plan is deemed not to discriminate in coverage.
Other tax incentives were granted to qualified plans also. Death benefits paid to an employee's beneficiary are not includible in the employee's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2039(c); nor is the first $5,000 includible in the beneficiary's gross income, despite the fact that the employee had a vested right to receive the
benefit during his life, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §101(b)(2)(B). In addition, lump sum distributions of pension benefits were accorded capital gains treatment until 1969 when Congress began to phase out such treatment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §402(a)(5).
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tributions through a trust, 55 and the plan had to operate for the exclusive
benefit of employees. 6
The tax treatment accorded nonqualified plans was considerably less
favorable. An employer could deduct contributions only if the employee's
rights to those contributions were vested when the contributions were made,
and only in the year of payment.57 A nonqualified trust was taxed on the
"interest"' it earned,59 and contributions had to be included in the employee's gross income if his rights were vested when the employer made the
contributions. 0° In other words, the employer could deduct the contribution

only if the employee realized taxable income when it was made.6 1
Until 1962 sole proprietors and partners who maintained qualified plans
for their employees were not allowed to deduct any contributions made on
their own behalf. 62 As this situation tended to discourage small employers
from adopting pension plans,r 3 Congress amended the Internal Revenue

55. Strictly speaking, it is the trust that qualifies. If a plan meets the requirements of
§401(a), then the trust is qualified for tax exemption under §501(a). Plans with qualified
trusts are called "qualified plans," as are those plans otherwise meeting the requirements of
§401(a) but utilizing certain custodial accounts or annuity contracts in lieu of trusts. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§401(f), (g). As used in this note, the term "qualified plan" has its more
usual meaning: a pension plan with a qualified trust.
56. Although it need not provide benefits for all employees, a plan must benefit the
employees in general. TREAS. REc. §l.401-1(b)(3). This interpretation reinforces the antidiscrimination provisions and has served as the peg on which many court decisions involving alleged discrimination have been hung. See, e.g., Loevsky v. Commissioner, 471 F.2d 1178
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); Cornell-Young Co. v. United States, 469 F.2d
1318 (5th Cir. 1972); Auner v. United States, 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971); Container Serv.
Co. v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Hall v. United States, 303 F. Supp.
326 (D. N.Dak. 1969), remanded by 398 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968); John Duguid & Sons, Inc.
v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1967); Bernard McMenamy, 54 T.C. 1057 (1970).
Courts have uniformly looked beyond the plan's description to its actual operation to determine whether it discriminates in favor of the prohibited class - officers, shareholders, and
highly paid employees.
Recognizing that employer contributions constitute one-half of Social Security taxes, the
Treasury Department has allowed reductions in employer payments to private pension
trusts so as to "avoid making duplicating contributions to Social Security and the qualified
plan with respect to the same compensation." L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 132.
57. H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), cited in J. SEIDM AN. supra note
46, at 1381. There was no carryover of excess deductions to subsequent years, as is the case
with qualified plans. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(D).
58. "Interest" includes investment earnings in pension terminology. Op. No. 8, supra
note 31, at 6555.
59. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1974).
23
60. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ (p), 165(a), (b) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§401-04,

641).
61. This must have created some interesting conflicts. Employees, on the one hand, were
torn between a desire to have vested pension rights and a desire to avoid paying taxes on
money they would not receive until retirement. On the other hand, employers wanted to
deduct the contributions but also wanted to delay vesting until retirement.
62. J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 19.
63. Id.
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Code in 1962 to allow deductions for contributions made on behalf of sole
proprietors and partners.6 4
Given the tremendous amounts of money involved in pension funds,6 5
with current aggregate yearly contributions of $20 billion,6 6 employers have
a powerful incentive to ensure that their pension plans qualify for the preferential tax treatment. The price of this preference to employers has been
the extension of pension benefits to rank-and-file employees. 67 The congressional grant of $4 billion in annual tax subsidy6 was justified only if the broad
64. At first, individual proprietors and partnerships were denied the tax benefits granted
to corporations in establishing qualified plans in which the owners could participate. In
1962 this inequality was removed with the passage of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax
Retirement Act (H.R. 10), Pub. L. No. 87-792 (1962). Sole owners or partners of unincorporated businesses, termed "owner-employees" in §401(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
were for the first time permitted to set up plans in which they could participate (Keogh
plans, so named for one of the sponsors of the bill). The purpose of enacting H.R. 10 was
"principally to encourage employers to adopt plans covering a broad range of employees."
L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 31. Special rules were added, however, to assure that such plans
would actually be used to provide pensions and not merely as a means of putting aside
money earned in a good year to be "distributed" in a less profitable year and taxed at
lower rates. In other words, Congress sought to keep H.R. 10 plans from becoming taxsheltered opportunities for owner-employees and shareholder-employees to select the year
of taxation most favorable to them. Consequently, no payments can be made to an owneremployee before he is 59% years old, unless he becomes disabled. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§401(d). H.R. 10 plans must cover every employee with 3 or more years of service, id., and
employees' rights are nonforfeitable when the contributions are made. Id. H.R. 10 restricted
annual contributions on behalf of an owner-employee or a shareholder-employee of a Subchapter S corporation to the lesser of $2,500 or 10% of his earned income. Violation of this
limitation could result in a number of penalties, including the permanent disqualification of
the plan with respect to the owner or partner.
The PRA increases the contribution ceiling to the lesser of $7,500 or 15% of earned
income or compensation but restricts to the first $100,000 the amount of earned income of
an owner-employee or shareholder-employee that can be considered in applying the percentage limitations. These two ceiling figures appear to contradict each other: $7,500 is only
7 c/%of $100,000; or 15% 'of $50,000.IIn th6 context of the'problem addressed by Congress, however, it takes on meaning with regard to the general policy of nondiscrimination.
S. -REp. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973). Under prior law, $2,500 represented a
minute proportion of the very substantial income earned by some owner-employees. Section
401(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code specifically provides that a uniform relationship of
contribution to compensation is not considered discriminatory. If the same percentage rate
were applied to lower-salaried, nonowning employees' income, the contributions on their
behalf would be nominal. For example, an owner-employee with income of $200,000 would
reach his contribution limit at 3.75%. The same rate of contribution for an employee earning $10,000 -would xesult in annual contributions of $375 - a sum not likely to provide much
retirement security. Thus, under the PRA, if an employer wants to take full advantage of the
$7,500 deduction, he must contribute 7 % of his employees' salaries to the plan. Id.
65. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
66. FoRToNE, Jan. 1975, at 78.

67. L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 63.
68. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1974). But see Goetz, The Myth of
Special Concessions for Qualified Pension Plans, 51 IowNA L. REv. 561 (1966). Professor
Goetz' premise is that the tax treatment accorded qualified plans is the norm under general taxing principles and the treatment given to nonqualified plans is the deviation. See
also Goetz, Tax Treatment of Private and Public Pension Systems, in PRIVAT.E PENsIONs AND
SPomL-c INTrPxsr 85 (1970).
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social aim of retirement security for more workers was furthered. 6

Still,

tax law had its inherent limitations. Even if a pension plan were found
to be discriminatory, the only sanction was disqualification. While this
would disallow at least a part of the employer's deductions, thereby increasing
the amounts necessary to fund a defined benefit plan,7 0 disqualification would
also punish the very person for whose benefit Congress initially granted the
subsidy - the employee."1 His pocketbook would be invaded by increased
tax liability during his peak earning years. Because his marginal tax rate
would be higher then than after retirement, the total tax paid on his pension would be greater. It is not surprising that tax regulation of pension
plans has proved inadequate to protect the employee's interest, however, for
the primary function of taxes is to raise revenue. The primary weapon with
which to enforce congressional determinations of social policy in the tax
arena is the imposition of additional taxes or the elimination of previous
tax preferences.
Labor Law
With the exception of the Internal Revenue Code's regulation of qualified
trusts, the first direct federal intervention in pension fund administration
came with the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).7 2 Tax
law, through its typical use of carrot and stick, had neglected the soft midsection of the pension formula. Union management of members' funds was
virtually unregulated. Scandalous cases of extortion, bribery, and official
misconduct began to surface shortly after the end of World War 1173 The
threat of plan disqualification was of little intimidating effect to indifferent
and unscrupulous union officers charged with the administration of the
vast holdings of pension funds. Section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA7 4 was a congressional prescription designed to ensure that union fiduciaries were given
a stake in the unmolested transfer of pension benefits from employer to
employee.
The LMRA exempted pension contributions from a general prohibition
against payments by management to labor organizations7 5 and established
broad guidelines governing the administration of the funds by union
officials. Among other requirements, union pension funds were to be audited
annually and were to be kept in separate accounts to prevent commingling
with other union funds. Most significant, however, was the requirement
69. L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 64.
70. Since trust income would be taxable, the employer's contributions would have to be
larger to provide the same retirement benefit.
71. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans of the Senate Comm. on
Finance,93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 249 (1973).

72. 29 U.S.C. §§141-88 (1970).
73. Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential Pensioner's Pension -An Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 40
BROOKLYN L. REv. 521, 535 (1974).
74. 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5) (1970).
75. Id. §186(a).
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that pension funds be administered for the "sole and exclusive benefit" of
the union membership. 0 Courts interpreted this provision to mean:
The trustees of such a trust, while possessing a large measure of discretion in prescribing conditions of eligibility for benefits, owe a
fiduciary duty to the employees and may neither impose unreasonable
of eligibility nor act arbitrarily in determining who is
conditions
77
eligible.
Criminal sanctions were imposed for violations of section 302, prescribing
fines of up to $10,000 or one year imprisonment, or both.
The 1959 enactment of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)78 supported the LMRA by prescribing common law
fiduciary standards for the administration of union pension funds.79 Also
in 1959, Congress passed the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
(WPPDA),0 designed to uncover the mechanical operations of virtually every
private pension plan having 26 or more participants. 8, An enforcement apparatus, created by amendment in 1962, imposed criminal sanctions for violations of the Act. Fundamentally, WPPDA required (1) the filing with the
Secretary of Labor of a detailed description of the plan within 90 days of
its establishment; (2) annual reports to the Secretary divulging plan assets,
liabilities, and employer contributions; and (3) retention and availability of
plan records for inspection by participants. In addition, WPPDA provided
for civil enforcement of the Act by covered employees.
Collectively, the LMRA, LMRDA, and WPPDA provided the first governmental delineation of fiduciary standards for trustees of pension funds.8 2 Although helpful within its intrinsic limitations, this legislative poultice called
attention to other problem areas. There was still no assurance that employees
would ultimately receive the funds ostensibly allocated for their benefit. Plan
termination insurance was needed, since even the soundest investments can
backfire. Furthermore, unless plans were adequately funded, the imposition of
fiduciary standards was in many cases an exercise in futility, like installing
a vault to protect a piggy bank. Moreover, without provisions for vesting,
even the piggy bank might be forfeited. Clearly, more was required. The
challenge was to cure, not to palliate.
Common Law
State law has been singularly ineffectual in meeting this challenge.
76. Id. §186(c)(5).
77. Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1509, 1311 (9th Cir. 1971). Accord, Roark v. Boyle, 459 F.2d
497 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d
744 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1970).
79. Id. §501. Section 501(b) of the LMRDA provides remedies for the breach of §501(a)
fiduciary duties, including, but not limited to, damages.
80. 29 U.S.C. §§01-09, repealed by Act §l1l(a)(1).
81. 29 U.S.C. §303 (1970).
82. Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 73, at 547.
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Traditionally, state regulation of employees' entitlement to pension benefits
developed through judicial extrapolation of common law. Two basic theories
were employed for this purpose: gratuity and contract. s3 Under the gratuity
concept, employer contributions toward retirement income were designated
gifts to their employees and, as such, were revocable at will. 8 4 In rare instances

state courts held an employer's pension promise irrevocable on the basis of
promissory estoppel.8 5 Thus the promise, although a gratuity, became binding as the result of an employee's justifiable and detrimental reliance,
evidenced by continued and faithful service.8 In contrast to the gratuity
principle, the contract theory considered pension plans to represent contractual
obligations for deferred compensation undertaken in exchange for services
rendered. As consideration for faithful service, pension benefits were the
subject of a unilateral contract -a promise for a completed act -"and once
the act is completed by the acceptor [the employee] the offer cannot be
87
modified or withdrawn."
The results of this juridical pigeonholing are irreconcilable. Protection
under the contract theory was minimal, for benefits did not vest until
completion of tenure upon retirement. Nonetheless, it represented a relative
panacea in contrast to the utter lack of protection afforded workers by
gratuity principles. Plainly, this piecemeal approach to the burgeoning
phenomenon of private pensions was inadequate. The protrusion of common
law principles88 merely aggravated existing inequities between an employer
and his employees. A pension is neither a gratuity nor simply consideration
for long and faithful service, but constitutes deferred compensation that, but
for its deferral, would have been manifested in take-home pay or fringe

83. Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 461 (1955).
84. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944), holding that all pensions
are mere gratuities and, as such, are property of the company. Id. at 790; Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1 III. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E.2d 880 (1954), which held that the
employer possesses unilateral authority as to the nature of the plan. Id. at 520, 117 N.E.2d
at 882; Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (1954), stating: "[I]t seems
well settled in other jurisdictions that a pension plan that is purely voluntary on the part
of the employer and to which the employee makes no contribution, is not an enforceable
contract, but a mere gratuity, in which the employee has no vested right until he begins to
receive benefits thereunder." Id. at 443, 104 A.2d at 861; Friedman v. Romaine, 77 Misc. 2d
134, 352 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1974), where the court said: "It has long been the law with
respect to pension plans . . . thai the setting up of such a plan is entirely voluntary on the
part of the employer and that the benefits conferred thereby are gratuities which the employer has the right to refuse or discontinue as circumstances warrant." Id. at 140, 352
N.Y.S.2d at 357; McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (Sup. Ct.
1898), afJ'd, 167 N.Y. 530, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901).
85. See Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
86. Id.Contra, Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 521, 117
N.E.2d 880, 882 (1954).
87. Schofield v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 287, 39 P.2d 342, 344
(1934) (emphasis added). See also Sheehy v. Seilon, 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1969);
Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair Mfg. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 911, 468 P.2d 666 (1970).
88. See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
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benefits.8 9 The pension provisions of labor and tax law represented an implicit congressional acknowledgment of this principle but were inadequate
to protect the employee's pension rights.90 With private pension programs
mushrooming in both number and complexity,91 the need for a unified and
comprehensive approach to federal regulation had become critical by 1974.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

The Pension Reform Act is the most formidable legislative product of
the 93d Congress. 92 While the Act does not require any employer to establish
a retirement program, its regulatory provisions govern all private pension
plans established or maintained by employers or groups of employees engaged in or affecting commerce. 93 Because of the PRA's omnibus nature,
some general observations may serve to place in perspective its funding and
coverage features.

Administration and Enforcement
Two facets of the Act's administrative and enforcement apparatus are
immediately apparent. First, ministerial authority is apportioned among
two executive departments, Labor and Treasury, and the newly formed Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 94 Regulatory provisions are to be administered by the Secretary of Labor, tax provisions by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the insurance provisions by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.9" Most requirements for pension plans are set out twice in
the Act, once in Title I (Labor)98 and again in Title II (Tax).97 This
overlap is understandable in view of the evolution of federal pension law.
Since pre-1974 tax regulation alone was ihadequate to assure employee protection, 98 and, since the Labor Department was clearly not geared to administer tax law, it was inevitable that any statutory scheme for bringing
89. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 45. See R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 15, at
17; Hearings,supranote 71, at 245.
90. See text accompanying notes 14-18, 70-71, and following note 82 supra.
91. See note 19 supra.
92. The Act is the direct culmiriation of 5 separate bills, Childs, supra note 7, at 865,
respectively considered by four standing committees (Senate Finance, Senate Labor and
Public Welfare, House Ways and Means, and House Education and Labor) as well as the
conference committee. Divided into 5 titles, it includes 39 key definitions and adds, amends,
or repeals 135 separate Internal Revenue Code provisions.
93. Act §4(a). Plans excluded from the coverage provisions of Title I include governmental plans, church plans, plans complying with workman's compensation, disability and
unemployment laws, plans maintained outside the United States for the benefit of persons
substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens, and excess benefit plans. Act §4(b).
94. Act §§3001-04; see text accompanying notes 135-143 infra for a discussion of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
95. Id.
96. Act §202(a)(1)(A).
97. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §410.
98. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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all pension law under a single umbrella would have to encompass both
departments.
The second significant characteristic of the PRA is that it has teeth. Coercive interference with a participant's or beneficiary's rights under the Act
constitutes a criminal offense, 99 as does a willful violation of any reporting
or disclosure provision.100 In addition, civil actions may be brought by the
Secretary of Labor as well as by any participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to
recover benefits due or enforce rights under the terms of a plan, remedy
fiduciary breaches, or enjoin or obtain other equitable relief for the violation of Title I of the Act.10 1 Federal district courts have broad jurisdiction
to hear these actions 0 2 and the Tax Court is granted jurisdiction to issue
declaratory judgments for income tax qualification purposes.1 0 3 While employees' remedies are enhanced through the creation of new rights under
the Act, perhaps the most significant aspect of enforcement is that, for the
first time, employers have the right to a judicial determination of the
104
qualified status of their plans before committing substantial funds.
The effectiveness of the employees' remedies will depend to a large extent
on the reporting and disclosure provisions. The PRA substantially increases
the amount of paperwork involved in maintaining a plan. Trust administrators must file reports in unprecedented numbers with participants, the
Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.? ° Aside from the sheer volume, the most vexatious feature
of reporting and disclosure is the unavoidable overlap among the various
regulatory agencies. That Congress recognized this as a potential problem
is evidenced by entreaties to the departments concerned to coordinate report-

99. Act §§510-11. Violations are punishable by a fine of $10,000 or I-year imprisonment
or both.
100. Act §§501, 101-10. Violations are punishable by a $10,000 fine or 1-year imprisonment
or both, for an individual, or by a fine of $100,000 for "a person not an individual." Act
§501.
101. Act §502.
102. Id. District courts are granted original jurisdiction without regard to diversity of
citizenship or the amount in controversy. Suits may be brought where the plan is administered, where the breach occurred, or where the defendant resides or may be found. Id.
"State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in actions brought by a participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits, enforce rights, or to clarify rights under the terms of a plan (as distinguished from an action involving a violation of the Act)." Overbeck, Persons Upon Whom
Duties and Obligations Are Imposed Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 52 TAXES 881, 893 (1974).
103. Act §1041(a), to be codified as INT. Rrv. CODF OF 1954, §7476.
104. Under prior law, employers had no effective appeal from an IRS determination,
or refusal to make a determination, that a proposed plan failed to qualify for special tax
benefits. The employer was allowed to go to court only after he had established a plan,
contributed to it, made deductions and then had those deductions disallowed by the IRS.
Because of the costly nature of this process, both in money and time, employers rarely
disputed Service rulings even when they disagreed with the Service's position. H.R. REP. No.
93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1974).
105. See, e.g., Act §§101-09, 209, 302(c)(8), 1033, 4007, 4043, 6057(a), 6058(b).
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ing wherever possible. 06 Nonetheless, one skeptical commentator has remarked:
Perhaps this Congressional direction will have a salutary negative
effect on the proliferation of forms and reporting requirements. However, based on experience, one has some apprehension that Congress
may find it is in the same position as King Canute when he commanded the tides of the ocean not to roll in. LO7
As noted earlier, violation of the reporting and disclosure provisions may
result in criminal penalties. 105
Fiduciary Obligations
The PRA imposes a higher standard of care on fiduciaries than does
the common law. Every plan fiduciary is required to act solely in the interests
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries, for their "exclusive benefit, and
with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in conducting an enterprise of like character and with like aims."' 0 9 To
minimize investment risks, the Act generally requires diversification of plan
assets unless prudent to do otherwise 10 and places a 10 percent limit on
investments in employer-issued securities and employer-used real estate."I
With some exceptions,"12 fiduciaries may not engage in the following transactions between the plan and a party in interest:"11 the sale, exchange, or
lease of property; the lending of money or any other extension of credit; and
the furnishing of goods and services. In addition, the fiduciary is prohibited
from transferring any plan income or assets to or for the use of a party in
14
interest.'
Violations result in a five percent excise tax on the amount in15
volved," with an additional 100 percent tax imposed on the party in interest if the transaction is not corrected after notice from the Internal
Revenue Service." 6 Personal liability is imposed on a fiduciary for his own

106.
107.
108.
109.

See, e.g., Act §§1033(e), 3004(a), 4065.
Overbeck, supra note 102, at 888.
See note 100 supra.
Act §404(a)(1).

110. Act §404(a)(1)(C).
111. Act §407.
112. Act §408. The Secretary of Labor, after consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, is authorized to grant exceptions if he finds the transactions administratively
feasible, in the interests of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries. Act §408(a). For
the other numerous exceptions, see Act §408(b).
118. Act §3(14) defines "party in interest" broadly to include, inter alia, employers;
unions with participating members, fiduciaries, and employees and officers of a plan.
114. Act §406(a); Act §2003(a), to be codified as INT. Ra. CODE OF 1954, §4975(c)(1).
Under prior tax law, such transactions had only to be fair and reasonable. INT. Ry. CODE OF
1954, §§503(a)(1)(B), (b).
115.
116.

Act §2003(a), to be codified as INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§4975(a), (b).
Id. Thus, a total excise tax of 105% is possible. Payment of these taxes does not
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breaches 17 although, where the trust instrument specifically allocates duties,
he will generally not be liable for the dereliction of a co-fiduciary. 118 Bonding is required of most fiduciaries and other persons who handle plan
assets." 9
Contribution and Benefit Limitations

Because private pensions are considered supplementary retirement income and are subsidized by every other taxpayer, 120 the Act imposes ceiling
limitations on contributions and benefit payments to assure that pension
benefits are not "swollen completely out of proportion to the reasonable
'
needs of individuals for a dignified level of retirement income."5
21 In keeping
with the distinctive character of each kind of plan, limits are placed on
the contributions that may be made to a participant's account under a defined contribution plan and on the benefits that may be paid out under a
defined benefit plan. For defined contribution

plans,

1 22

annual additions123

to a participant's account may not exceed the lesser of 25 percent of his
compensation or $25,000.124 For defined benefit plans,

25

the PRA limits yearly

benefit payments to the lesser of 100 percent of the average annual compensation for the participant's highest three consecutive years, or $75,000.12r

Exceeding these ceilings will result in disqualification of the trust for tax
relieve the party in interest of his obligation to repay to the plan the amount involved in
the prohibited transaction.
117. Act §409.
118. Act §405.
119. Act §412. Persons other than fiduciaries who would handle plan assets would include, for instance, clerical personnel and the administrative staff of the pension plan. Exceptions to the bonding requirement include fiduciaries that are corporations organized and
doing business under the laws of the United States or any state, persons authorized under
state or federal law to exercise trust powers or to conduct an insurance business, persons
subject to supervision or examination by federal or state authority, and persons with a
combined capital and surplus in excess of at least $1 million. Id.
120. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
121. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1974).
122. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
123. "Annual additions" means the sum of the employer's contributions, the lesser of
half the employee's contributions or the employee's contribution in excess of 6% of his
compensation, and any other participants' forfeitures that are added to his account. Act
§2004(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §415(c). It does not include tax-free
transfers ("rollovers") between qualified plans or individual retirement accounts. Id.; see
note 296 infra and accompanying text.
124. Act §2004(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §415(c).
125. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
126. Act §2004(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §415(b). However, if benefits are to begin before age 55 (early retirement), the $75,000 ceiling shall be reduced to
reflect the potential additional years during which the participant will be receiving benefits.
Act §2004(a), to be codified as IN'iT. REV. ConE OF 1954, §415(b)(2)(C). In any event, his annual benefit can be as much as $10,000 notwithstanding the preceding limitations. Act
§2004(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §415(b)(4). If a participant has less than
10 years of service with his employer, his defined benefits are reduced proportionately. Act
§2004(a), to be codified as INT. RE'. CODE OF 1954, §415(b)(5).
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by the
purposes, 127 although all limitations are to be adjusted 1 annually
28
Secretary of the Treasury to reflect cost-of-living increases.
Taxability of Lump Sum Distributions
While most plans are designed to pay the employee a supplemental retirement income, a number of defined contribution plans provide for a
lump sum distribution of an employee's entire accrued benefit at retirement.
29
Such distributions were taxed as capital gains' until 1969, when Congress
began to phase out this provision, essentially continuing capital gains treatment for the portion of a distribution attributable to pre-1970 accumulations, while taxing the post-1969 employer contributions as ordinary income. 30 Since 1969 the phaseout has represented a Gordian knot for the
authors of the Treasury's tax regulations, as well as the taxpayers themselves.' 3 1 In fact, it is "frequently maintained that lump sum distributees are
unable to compute their taxes, and that accountants and tax lawyers have
been refusing to attempt the computations."' 132 In an effort to cut the knot,
the PRA, while retaining the concept of the 1969 amendment, simplifies
the method of computing the tax. 33 The Act provides for capital gains
treatment of that portion of the lump sum representing pre-1974 value. The
post-1973 portion will be taxed as ordinary income, but the retiree may
use a 10-year forward averaging in which for purposes of rate determination
all other income is ignored. If the individual elects to use the averaging
received
device, however, he may incur additional current liability if he 3 has
4
years.1
five
preceding
the
in
distributions
sum
lump
other
any
Insurance Against Plan Termination
Despite all its eloquent promises, requirements, and penalties, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 would be meaningless without some assurance that retired employees will ultimately receive their expected benefits. Accordingly, the Act establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, 3 5 which will provide insurance against plan termination. It
127. Act §2004(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §415; see text accompanying
notes 57-60 supra for a discussion of the effects of disqualification.
128. Act §2004(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §415(d).
129. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §402(a)(2).
130. Tax Reform Act of 1969, §515(a)(1) (now I.Tr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §402(a)(5)).
131. See TREAs. REG. §1.402(a)-I; PROPOSED TaRAs. REG. §l402(a)-2.
132. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1974).
133. Act §2005(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §402(e)(1)(C). The Act adds
5 years of capital gains treatment to lump sum distributions. Id.
134. Act §2005(a), to be codified as INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §402(e)(2). This 6-year "lookback" provision requires that all lump sum distributions made in the 5-year period immediately preceding the recipients current taxable year be added to the current distribution,
and that a tax on the cumulative total be computed, thus pushing the present amount into
a higher tax bracket. After dedticting from the cumulative tax the amount already paid on
the prior distributions, the resulting balance is the amount of current tax liability.
135. Act §4002(a).
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will be administered by the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce, and the
Treasury, 136 who will receive counsel from a seven-member advisory board
appointed by the President. 137 Uniform premium rates will be prescribed
for single-employer and for multi-employer plans respectively,'" based on
one of three figures - the number of plan participants, unfunded benefit
liabilities, or total guaranteed benefits. 39 Generally, the Act provides that all
nonforfeitable benefits are to be insured by the Corporation.140 The Corporation may additionally insure such other nonbasic benefits as it deems appropriate.' In the event a plan does terminate, an employer must indemnify
the Corporation for all amounts it pays his employees, up to 30 percent of
his net worth.' 42 The employer may, however, purchase additional insurance
43
to cover these liabilities.'
,['HE

PRA: A

REACTION

A great deal of controversy has centered around the mandatory insurance
provisions, which are seen by some employers as an unwarranted incursion
into private business.144 Few, however, would doubt the equity of the new
provisions allowing aggrieved plan participants their day in court or assuring
an employer his right to a determination of tax qualification status before
his plan is implemented. Similarly, few would question the desirability of
the high standards of care imposed on persons entrusted with pension funds.
Furthermore, while some employers undoubtedly consider the increased

136. Act §4002(d).
137. Act §4002(h). This board will consist of 2 members from employee organizations, 2
from management, and 3 representing the general public. Id.
138. Act §4006(a). A "multi-employer plan" is defined as a plan instituted pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement lo which more than one employer is required to contribute
and which pays benefits regardless of whether a participant's employer ceases to contribute.
The amount of contributions made by any one employer during the first plan year must be
less than 50% of the aggregated contributions for that year made by all the employers. In
subsequent years, the 50% rule may be expanded to 75%. Act §§3(37), 1015(0.
139. Act §4006(a). For the first full year following enactment, single-employer plans are
to pay $1 per plan participant, and multi-employer plans are to pay 500 per plan participant.
Id.
140. Act §4022(a). Given the Act's funding provisions, see text accompanying notes 229270 infra, insurance would seem unnecessary. Because of the slow amortization of past service
costs, see note 242 infra, however, a possibility of inadequate funding still exists.
141. Act §4022(c). These might include, for example, death, disability and medical benefits. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1974); S. RE'. No. 93-383, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 82 (1973).
142. Act §4062(b). Although the Act does not specify, the "30% rule" presumably applies to each plan maintained by an employer. Lindquist, The Pension Remodeling Act of
1974, 52 TAXES 873, 876 (1974). Liability can thus exceed net worth where 4 or more plans
are terminated by a single employer.
143. Act §4023.
144. Hearings, supra note 71, pt. 1, at 399, 403-04. "NAM [National Association of Manufacturers] believes that the concept of plan termination insurance is unworkable, inequitable
and undesirable." Id.
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reporting and disclosure requirements unnecessarily burdensome, 145 few could
seriously contend that employees should not be aware of the mechanics of
their plan's operations. There is less agreement, however, with regard to
the reports that must be made to the Government. 1 46 Nevertheless, these
new standards would probably be palatable to most employers if more
federal regulation of pensions were not imposed. But there is more- much
more. The PRA is fundamentally a response to an extensive catalogue of
much-publicized horrors involving the disenfranchisement of retired em47
ployees due to inequitable forfeiture and plan insolvency.
Before the PRA, more than half the people who expected pensions never
received them, 48 prompting Professor Merton C. Bernstein, the "Ralph Nader
of pensions,"'149 to reflect: "The losses of many provide the funds with which
the payoff is made to the lucky few-just as at any honest race track."': 50
Still, employers and pension administrators contend that most plans worked:
that their funding was adequate and that more people were receiving pension benefits than ever before.' 51 They point to the fact that the phenomenal
growth of pension plans has taken place in the private sector without
governmental supervision. In addition to a basic, philosophical disagreement with the Act's increased federal regulation, these pension specialists
view the PRA as "a bureaucratic nightmare."'152 One consultant has asserted
that the Act represents "overkill":
It will cost the U.S. economy a third of a billion dollars a year just
to administer this act. It's like calling out the Army, Navy, and Air
Force and searching every53man on the street because one lady was
mugged in Central Park.'
While it is true that the vast majority of pre-1974 plans operated as they
were designed to-including the fine-print forfeiture clauses that employees
generally were unaware of -still the benefits were available at retirement
only to those employees with the winning tickets. Congressional reaction
145.

FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 81.
146. Id.
147. See generally Hearings, supra note 71; Hearings on Tax Proposals Affecting Private
Pension Plans Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
Childs, supra note 7. See R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, supra note 15, for an illustration of the
types of abuses involved.
Perhaps the most dramatic and publicized case of a plan insolvency that resulted in mass
forfeiture of pension benefits was the closing of the Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana,
in 1964. Of the 8,500 employees discharged, only those who were 60 years old or older and
had at least 10 years of service received their full benefits. The rest either lost their entire
pension or received a small fraction on every dollar. Id. at 9.
148. See id. at 1.
149.

Jackson, Comments, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INmREST 51, 54 (1970).

150. Cited in R. NADER & K. BLACKWF.LL, supra note 15, at 11.
151. Hearings,supra note 71, at 397.
152.

FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 81.

153. Id., citing Preston C. Bassett, vice president of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby,
actuarial and consulting firm.
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to this race track syndrome crystallized in the Act's comprehensive provisions for participation, vesting, and funding.
PARTICIPATION

It is therefore desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries . . . that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans."CONGRESSIONAL FINDING:

Although the PRA reflects societal abrogation of the theory that pensions
are a "reward" for long and faithful service, 1 5 Congress has recognized employers' legitimate interest in limiting retirement protection to relatively
stable employees. Thus, the Act's participation provisions effect a compromise
between the employee's need to begin accruing pension rights as early as
possible and the employer's desire to avoid the administrative headaches involved in granting coverage to immature and transient employees.15 6 It will
be recalled that participation, or membership, refers to the period during
which the employer makes contributions for the employee's benefit." 57 An
employee will be allowed to participate after he has met the plan's initial
eligibility requirements. Before proceeding to a dissection of the new participation requirements, however, it should be emphasized that participation,
vesting, and benefit accrual comprise a virtually seamless web. While
diagrammatic isolation of these discrete elements is both possible and necessary at this point, ultimately they must be considered together. Moreover,
it is vital that participation be recognized as the key to all of the other
benefits attributable to the PRA's regulation of pension plans. Requirements
for vesting and termination insurance, for instance, become completely
worthless to an employee unless lie is able to participate in his particular
plan.
Under prior law there were few limits on the length of service or the
age that could be required of employees before they were permitted to
enter a pension plan.15 Many plans, therefore, excluded great numbers of
relatively young or mobile workers. The PRA changes such situations. As
previously noted, most requirements, including those relating to participation, are set out twice in the Act, once in Title I (Labor) and again in Title
II (Tax).159 Under both sections the general participation requirement is
that no pension plan may exclude, on account of age or service, an employee
who has completed one year of service or attained the age of 25, whichever
154.
155.
156.
tend to

Act §2(a).
See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra and accompanying note 192 infra.
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974). Young employees as a group
change jobs and even industries more frequently than their more mature fellow

workers. Id. at 44.

157.

See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.

158.

See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §401(d)(3), requiring H.R. 10 plans (see note 64

supra) to benefit all employees with 3 or more years of service.
159. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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occurs later; 160 nor may it exclude older employees solely on the basis of
age.' 6 This rule, like all requirements under Title I, is mandatory. Thus,
while violations will merely disqualify a plan under Title 11,162 thereby insuring unfavorable tax treatment,'6 3 the same violations will render it illegal
under Title I64 and subject to civil sanction.6 5 As with all general rules,
however, the participation requirement has exceptions. The most notable
is that if a plan provides for 100 percent vesting'6 6 after only three or fewer
years of employment, it may restrict participation to employees who have
completed three years of service. 67 Further, although the general participation rule bans age discrimination, a defined benefit plan 6 may exclude an
employee who is within five years of the plan's normal retirement age at the
time his employment commences. 69 Clearly, Congress recognized that the
prohibitive costs of providing defined benefits to retired employees after
short-term service would deter employers from hiring such older workers. 7 0
This exception does not apply to defined contribution plans because the contribution, being fixed by the terms of the plan, would be no higher for an
older participant than for a young one.
For purposes of determining the participation apprenticeship periods
set out above, the PRA generally defines a year of service as a 12-month
period during which the employee worked not less than 1,000 hours.' 7 ' This
year is to be figured on the basis of the date on which the employee commenced work. 7 2 The Secretary of Labor is charged with defining an hour
160. Act §202(a)(1)(A); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §410(a)(1)(A).
A pension plan may, of course, exclude employees for reasons other than age and service.
Supervisory personnel, for example, may be excluded from a plan designed to cover only the
rank-and-file.
161. Act §202(a)(2); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(2).
162. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(1)(A).
163. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.

164. Act §202(a)(1)(A).
165. See text accompanying notes 101-102 supra.
166. For a discussion of vesting, see text accompanying notes 208-228 infra.
167. Act §202(a)(1)(B)(i); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(1)
(B)(i). Additionally, if a plan is maintained exclusively for employees of a tax-exempt educational institution, IN'r. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§170(b)(1)(A)(ii), 501(a), and provides - for immediate 100% vesting upon participation, it may limit participation to indivduals who have
attained the age of 30, rather than 25. Act §202(a)(1)(B)(ii); Act §1011, to be codified as INT.
RiEv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(1)(B)(ii). While these two exceptions appear capable of joint
implementation, the Act specifically disallows such a plan provision. Id.
168. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
169. Act §202(a)(2); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(2).
170. H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974). Congressional pronouncements notwithstanding, this rationale is
strained at best when applied to a pension formula that is based on years of service.
171. Act §202(a)(3)(A); Act §1011, to be codified as INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(3)(A).
The employee would thus average a minimum of 20 hours a week for 50 weeks a year. This
formula is admittedly arbitrary but represents an-attempt by Congress to establish some degree of standardization, without which it would be easy to visualize employers requiring unfair, and perhaps outrageous, annual accumulations of working hours in order to achieve a
"year of service."
172. Alternatively, where the employee has not completed 1,000 hours of service in the
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of service1 7 3 To determine the apprenticeship period, all years of an employee's service are taken into account, 174 and after he has satisfied the
eligibility requirements, he must be allowed to commence participation at
the beginning of the next plan year.175
While the participation standards are repeated in Title II as part of
the qualification requirements for favorable tax treatment,1 Title II contains additional provisions l 7 incorporating these standards into the antidiscrimination rules.17 Under prior tax law, it will be remembered, a plan
would not qualify unless it covered 70 percent of all employees, or 80 percent of those eligible if 70 percent were eligible,1 79 or unless it covered those
employees deemed eligible under a classification system that did not disfirst full calendar year of his employment, the year of service may be a plan year. Act
§202(a)(3)(A); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(3)(A). In the case
of a maritime industry, 125 days shall be substituted for 1,000 hours. Act §202(a)(3)(D), Act
§1011, to be codified as INT. Riv. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(3)(D). For seasonal industries in
which the customary period of employment is less than 1,000 hours a calendar year, the
Secretary of Labor is authorized to promulgate regulations defining a year of service. Act
§202(a)(3)(B); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(3)(B). This is to
provide sufficient flexibility to ensure that the varying circumstances of these industries are
treated individually. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
173. Act §202(a)(3)(C); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(3)(C).
174. Act §202(b)(1); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(5)(A).
However, service prior to a 1-year break in service (a I-year break in service is defined as
less than 500 hours during any plan year, or other 12-consecutive-month period. Act
§203(b)(3)(A); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(6)(A)) need not
be regarded for plans using the 100% vesting, 3-year participation option. Act §202(b)(2); Act
§1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(5)(B). Moreover, employee service
prior to a 1-year break in service need not be taken into account until such employee has
completed a year of service upon his return. Act §202(b)(3); Act §1011, to be codified as INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(5)(C). Finally, where an employee's consecutive 1-year breaks in
service equal or exceed the aggregate number of years of service prior to the break, prebreak service may be totally disregarded for purposes of determining the respective apprenticeship periods. Act §202(b)(4); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§410(a)(5)(D). It is readily apparent that an employee who accumulates between 500 and 1,000
hours will occupy a "twilight zone," having neither a year of service nor a break in service.
The Act additionally requires that pre-participation service for a predecessor employer be
treated as service for the new employer where the latter maintains the same plan as the
former. Act §1015(a)(1), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §414(a)(1). In the event
that the new employer institutes another plan, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to treat such prior service as Current service to the extent he deems appropriate. Act
§1015(a)(2), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §414(a)(2). If an employee works for
a company that maintains a multiemployer plan, see note 130 supra, his apprenticeship
service shall not be diminished in the event he changes employment but stays within the
multi-employer unit. Act §1014(c)(1), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. §413(c)(1).
175. Act §202(a)(4); Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(a)(4). The
Act allows this limited delay for administrative convenience. In any event, the employee
must be permitted to enter the plan within 6 months after he has met the participation
requirements, no matter when the next plan year begins. Id.
176. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410.
177.
178.
179.

Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §410(b).
Id.; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §401(a); see text accompanying note 54 supra.
See note 54 supra.
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criminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisory or highly paid employees.' s0 The only change in these antidiscrimination rules is the exclusion
of certain groups from consideration in applying the 70 percent test. Employees who have not yet satisfied the age or service requirements' s ' are disregarded, 18 2 as are union members whose collective bargaining agents reject
pension benefits after good-faith bargaining. 83 The purpose of this latter
exclusion is to enable employers with both union and nonunion employees
to offer pension coverage to their nonunion employees.8 4 Before this amendment, many such employers were foreclosed from establishing qualified plans
because union employees, without whom the 70 percent test could not be
met, had chosen not to participate 8 s In view of the above exceptions, it
may seem somewhat incongruous that older employees, who may be excluded
from participation in defined benefit plans, 86 may not be disregarded for
breadth-of-coverage determination. 187 Apparently Congress was reluctant to
allow employers to take undue advantage of the maximum age exception by
hiring primarily older persons, then denying them the benefits of pension
plans.
The PRA's participation standards should thus prove effective as a means
of "assuring the equitable character of [pension] plans."' 88 Clearly, no pension
plan can provide retirement security for an individual who is not a participant. It is equally dear that many plans will have to broaden their
coverage to admit previously excluded employees; even those who would
have eventually been covered may now participate sooner, thereby increasing
potential retirement benefits. At the same time, employers' interests 89 have
180. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, §401(a)(3). Prior law also included in the prohibited class
employees "whose principal duties consist in supervising the work of other employees." Id.
The PRA deletes this supervisory category, presumably on the assumption that such persons
would also be considered "highly paid employees." Act §1011, to be codified as INT. RiEv.
CODE OF 1954, §410(b).
"The terms 'highly compensated' and 'lower compensated' are relative, and the distinction between them must be based upon the circumstances of each case." Rev. Rul. 56-497,
1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 284, 286.
181. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
182. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(b)(1)(A).
183. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, §410(b)(2)(A). Two other
groups of employees are excluded from consideration in applying coverage standards. Any
plan may disregard nonresident alien employees if none of their income is deemed to come
from sources within the United States. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§410(b)(2)(C). In addition, collectively bargained plans for airline pilots who are represented
in accordance with the Railway Labor Act may exclude employees not covered by the agreement. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §410(b)(2)(B). This latter exclusion may later be extended to other professional groups. Act §§3021-22; H.R. REP. No.
93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1974).
184. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974).
185. Id.
186. See text accompanying notes 169-170 supra.
187. Act §1011, to be codified as INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §410(b)(1)(A); H.R. REP. No.
93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1974).
188. Act §2(a).
189. See text accompanying notes 155-156 supra.
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not been completely arrogated in the fever to right past wrongs. Congress
had the power, after all, to decree that all employees would be allowed to
participate immediately, without exception. The participation standards
appear to effect an equitable compromise between the employers and employees. The right to participate, however, is only as valuable as the pension
itself.
VESTING AND

BENEFIT ACCRUAL

FINDING: [D]espite the enormous growth in such plans
many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated
retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such
190
plans.
CONGRESSIONAL

Although in a bygone era American workers remained at one job during
most of their working lives, today's labor force must be responsive to the
demands of a highly mobile economy. Society's need for a competitive
labor market should not be frustrated by a 19th century pension philosophy.
On the other hand, had it not been for employers' legitimate desire to retard
costly employee turnover, private pensions, which themselves represent substantial employer expenditure, might never have evolved as a major factor
in retirement planning. While not unmindful of employer costs, Congress'
primary purpose in enacting guidelines for vesting and benefit accrual was
to protect employees against inequitable forfeiture of retirement benefits. 1
Vesting, like participation, is valuable only when the property in which
one has a vested right is itself valuable. It becomes necessary, therefore, to
explore the workings of benefit accrual before proceeding with vesting.
T
M

Benefit Accrual
Many pension plans formulated before the PRA provided that only
minuscule benefits could accrue during the early years of an employee's
participation while major portions accumulated in the years just preceding
retirement. This practice, called "backloading," permitted employers to
continue to treat pensions much like a "gold watch given at a retirement
banquet: a reward for long and faithful service.' ' 1 92 Under the PRA such
practices are severely curbed.
For defined contribution, or money purchase, plans, 9 the accrued benefit
is simply the balance in a participant's account. 9 4 It is considerably more
190. Act §2(a).
191. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1974). Basically, accrual (see text
accompanying note 39 supra) refers to the rate at which retirement benefits accumulate, and
vesting (see text accompanying note 40 supra) refers to the rate at which the accrued benefits become nonforfeitable.
192. L. Lokken, supra note 27, at 121.
193. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
194. Act §204(c)(2)(A); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(7).
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difficult, however, to say what constitutes an accrued benefit in a defined
benefit plan. 195 For this reason, the balance of this section deals with vesting
and accrual in the context of a defined benefit plan.
Accrued benefits under a defined plan are expressed in terms of a "normal
retirement benefit"'19 and, for administrative convenience, do not include
such ancillary benefits as medical or life insurance. 9 7 In order to check
excessive backloading, 98 the Act contains three alternative formulas for computing accrual rates: the three percent rule, the 133 1/3 percent rule, and
the fractional rule.0 9 Under the three percent formula, a plan may provide
for accrual at three percent each year, with a maximum participation period
of 33 1/3 years. 20 0 At this rate, an employee who leaves his job after 10 years
of participation would have to be credited with 30 percent of the normal retirement benefit. If the normal benefit were $2,000 a year, the employee
would have accrued $600 per year.2 0
The 133 1/3 percent rule20 2 provides that the rate at which the normal retirement benefit accrues in any year must not be greater than 133 1/3 pergcent of the rate at which it accrued in any prior year.2.0 3 Stated another way,
the accrual rate in an early -year must be at least three-fourths the rate in
any later year. If the plan contemplates 33 1/3 years for full benefit accrual,
Separate accounts must be maintained for all participants in defined contribution plans;
defined benefit plans that allow for employee contributions in addition to employer contributions must maintain separate accounts for each employee's contributions. Act §204(b)(2);
Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)(2). See XYZ example in text
following subheading A PENSION PRIMER.
195. See ABC example in text following subheading A PENSION PRMER.

196. The normal retirement benefit is the annual amount a participant will receive
when he reaches normal retirement age. Some plans provide pension incentives to retire
early, where the trade or business might require physical agility or other characteristics associated with youth. Where the incentive is a larger pension benefit than would be paid if
the employee continues to the normal retirement age, that greater amount will be considered
the normal retirement benefit. Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954,
§411(a)(9). While a plan may set its own normal retirement age, it may not delay benefit
receipt beyond a retiree's 65th birthday or the 10th anniversary of his entry into the plan,
whichever comes later. Act §3(24).
197. Act §1012(a), to be codified.as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(9).
198. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1974).
199. Act §204(b)(1); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)(1).
The three accrual rules described apply only to employees who quit before retirement. For
retiring employees there is another, much simpler rule: at retirement an employee's accrued
benefit must be 100% of the normal retirement benefit. See Act §203(a); Act §1012(a), to be
codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a).
200. Act §204(b)(1)(A); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)
(1)(A).
201. Of course, if the employee were only 50% vested, he would receive only $300 a
year at retirement. See note 41 supra and text accompanying notes 208-228 infra.
202. Act §204(b)(1)(B); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)

(1)(B).
203. Id. Plan amendments increasing the accrual rate for all participants, however, are to
be considered as having been in effect for all plan years for the purposes of this rule. Id.
Thus, if an amendment in 1980 increased the accrual rate from 1% to 3%, it would not
violate the 133 113% rule, even though it would represent 300% of the earlier rate.
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the average accrual rate would be three percent, as under the three percent rule,204 but the actual rate would be both smaller and greater. Under
the 133 1/3 percent rule, the plan could provide for lower accrual in the
early years of an employee's service with a correspondingly higher accrual
in the later years. This would allow the employer to reward those employees
who stay with the company. Under this standard, for example, a plan might
provide for a normal retirement benefit of 1.5 percent of compensation for
each of the first 20 years and two percent each year thereafter. 2 5 In such a
plan, the benefit formula would also define the accrual rate. Thus, where an
employee's annual compensation is $12,000, after 10 years he would have
accrued 1.5% x 10 years x $12,000, or $1,800 per year.
The third benefit accrual formula, the fractional or pro rata rule, 20 6 is far
less complex than the other two, although this is not apparent upon a first
reading of the statutory language. Stripped of obfuscatory verbiage, it simply
provides that an employee's accrued benefit is a straight-line proportion of
the normal retirement benefit based on his years of participation. If, for
example, a plan contemplates a normal benefit of $2,000 after 33 1/3 years
of participation, an employee with 10 years of participation has accrued
$600.60 per year (10 x $2,000 - 331/3).207
Vesting
Once an accrual rate has been developed in compliance with the PRA,
the provisions for nonforfeiture require that one of three vesting schedules
be superimposed. Thus, in practice, vesting and accrual are complements,
although they are to be treated separately during the initial stages of plan
formulation. In every instance vesting assumes the presence of an accrued
benefit.
While exceptions and alternatives permeate the vesting provisions of the
Act, certain requirements are categorical. Every plan must provide that an
employee's normal retirement benefit shall become nonforfeitable (100 percent vested) upon attainment of the normal retirement age. 20 8

Moreover,

each plan must also provide that an employee's right to that portion of his
204. See text accompanying notes 200-201 supra.
205. The Act provides that where benefits are based on average compensation during any
period, that average figure may not include more years than the 10-consecutive-year period
when the employee's compensation was highest. Act §204(b)(1)(A); Act §1012(a), to be
codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)(1)(A). The effect of this provision will generally
be beneficial to employees, since the average salary over an entire career is usually considerably less than a high-10-year average.
206. Act §204(b)(1)(C); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(b)
(1)(C).
207. The discussions of all 3 basic accrual rules are premised on a plan's being noncontributory, i.e., derived from employer contributions with no contributions by the employee. Where any part of a pension fund is derived from employee contributions, accrued
benefits are allocated under §204(c) and §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§411(c). It should be noted that these rules set only minimum standards; plans may provide
for more rapid accrual.
208. Act §203(a); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a).
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accrued benefit derived from his own contributions shall at all times be nonforfeitable. 20 And finally, every plan must provide that upon full or partial
210
plan termination, an employee's accrued benefits shall become fully vested.
It is interesting to note, however, that the substance of the vesting provisions
is expressed in terms of alternatives. In plain words, every employer is given
the opportunity to choose-but choose he must-which of three vesting
schedules his plan will implement.
Certainly the simplest option is the "10-year vesting" rule by which a
plan is obliged to provide 100 percent vesting of accrued benefits after 10
years of employee service.211 The merit of this alternative from the employer's
standpoint is that it avoids some of the recordkeeping and other administrative costs inherent in the partial vesting provisions of the other two
schedules. 21 2 Of the three schedules, it provides the greatest amount of protection to those employees who have the requisite 10 years of service; for
2 3
those with fewer than 10 years, however, it provides for no vesting at all. '
Not quite so simple is the second option, or "graded vesting" schedule.214
While this option requires some vesting relatively early in the employee's
career, it delays full vesting longer than the 10-year schedule. Plans using
the graded alternative must vest accrued benefits at the following rates: 21 5
Years of Service

Nonforfeitable Percentage

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

25
30
35
40
45
50
60
70
80
90
100

209. Act §203(a)(1); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(1).
210. Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(d)(3). This will ensure
that a participant will not forfeit his accrued benefit because of events over which he has no
control.
211. Act §203(a)(2)(A); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)
(2)(A).
212. H.R. REP'. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974).
213. Id. This "notch effect," from no vesting in year 9 to full vesting after year 10,
might induce an employer to dismiss an employee just before he completed his 10th year.
Where there has been a pattern of such abuse or where there is reason to believe there will
be such abuse leading to forfeitures that would discriminate in favor of the prohibited class,
see text accompanying note 54 supra, the Treasury Department may disqualify the plan even
though it meets the vesting standards of the Act. Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §411(d)(1).
214. Act §203(a)(2)(B); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)

(2)(B).
215. Id.
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Because vesting occurs gradually, this alternative avoids the so-called "notch"
effect, whereby an employee becomes entitled to too great a proportion of
his vested rights in a single year, thus giving the employer an incentive to
dismiss him prior to that point in order to avoid increased costs.2 16 A major
assumption of this schedule is that at least a part of the obligation to provide
retirement benefits should be shifted from the employee's last employer to
21
those who employ him early in his working career. 7
The final option is the "Rule of 45,"218s designed primarily to protect
older workers.219 This age-weighted approach provides that after five years
of service, an employee whose age and years of service total 45 must have a
nonforfeitable right to the following percentage of accrued benefits derived
22 0
from employer contributions:
If years of service
equal or exceed -

and sum of age and service
equals or exceeds -

nonforfeitable
percentage is -

5 ..................................45 ------------------------------ - 50
6 -------------- ...----------47 -------------------------------60
7
------------------- 49
------------------70
8 ......................
............
51 ------------------------------- - 80
9
53 -----------------------------90
10 -----------------5 5 .....................
...........10 0
Notwithstanding the above table, this rule also provides that if an employee
has completed 10 years of service, he must have a nonforfeitable right to 50
percent of his accrued benefits with a vested right to an additional 10 percent
for each year after the tenth. Therefore, regardless of which vesting schedule
his employer chooses, the latest any employee can be granted a 100 percent
vested right to his accrued benefits is 15 years after he begins participation.
These new vesting requirements, together with the liberalized provisions
for participation, will increase pension costs by somewhere between 5 and
10 percent, depending upon the plan's pre-Act schedules and eligibility re1
quirements, according to the president of one actuarial consulting firm.22
216. Compare the 10-year vesting rule discussed in text accompanying notes 211-213 supra.
217. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974). For example, an employer for
whom an employee worked for only 5 years early in his career would pay 25% of his
accrued benefit at retirement. It should be noted, however, that this does not mean the
employee will receive 25% of his normal pension. Rather, he will receive 25% of the
amount accrued, which could be as little as 15% of the normal pension. Twenty-five percent
of 15% is less than 4% of the normal retirement benefit. See note 41 supra.
218. Act §203(a)(2)(C); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)

(2)(C).
219. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93ld Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974).
220. Act §203(a)(2)(C); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)
(2)(C).
221. FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 81, citing Leonard Mactas, president of the consulting
actuaries division of Kwasha Lipton, Inc., of Englewood Cliffs, N.J. It must be noted, however, that there are extreme discrepancies between the estimated cost increases attributable
to the PRA's vesting requirements. For instance, projected increased costs for vesting under
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While a pension plan may, of course, allow for more rapid vesting than
is required by the Act 2 22 generally no rights, once they are vested under a
plan, may be forfeited by the employee under any circumstances. 223 In determining an employee's position on the vesting schedules, all service, including pre-participation service, must normally be taken into account. 224
Recognizing that there will be bona fide hardship cases during the transitional periods after the PRA becomes effective, Congress has provided a means
by which a variance of up to seven years may be granted. Upon a finding
that (1) the application of the vesting requirements would increase the cost
of the plan so as to jeopardize the voluntary continuation of the plan or
result in a substantial curtailment of benefits, and (2) the application of
such requirements or discontinuance of the plan would be adverse to the
interests of plan participants in the aggregate, and (3) a variance from the
minimum funding standards or an extension of amortization periods 225 would
S.4, not too dissimilar from the vesting provisions of the PRA, were placed at 0.1% to 0.2%
for prior plans having "moderate vesting" schedules. Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 26, at 1035.
222. Act §203(d).
223. H.R. RUP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974). There are exceptions to this
rule, however. A plan may provide that an employee's benefit may be forfeited upon his
death. Act §203(a)(3)(A); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(3)(A).
The plan may also provide that payment of benefits be halted for a period during which
the employee returns to work for the employer maintaining the plan under which the benefits are being paid. Act §203(a)(3)(B); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§411(a)(3)(B). Further, plan amendments having the effect of limited forfeiture may be given
retroactive effect if expressly authorized by the Secretary of Labor. Act §203(a)(3)(C); Act
§1012(a), to be codified as INT. REgv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(3)(C). Finally, a plan may provide
that if an employee withdraws his own mandatory contributions and is vested with less than
50% of his accrued benefits, such accrued benefits may be forfeited. Act §203(a)(3)(D); Act
§1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(3)(D). If a plan has this provision,
however, it must also provide that the forfeited right shall be restored upon repayment of
the employee's own contributions, with interest. Id.
224. Act §203(b)(1); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(4);
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974). Limited exceptions to this rule include
service prior to age 22 in certain circumstances, service during which an employee declined
to contribute to a plan requiring employee contributions, service with an employer during
any period for which the employer did not maintain a plan, service prior to a 1-year break
in service under specified conditions, and years of service prior to Jan. 1, 1971, unless the
employee has had at least 3 years of service after Dec. 31, 1970. Act §203(b)(1); Act §1012(a),
to be codified as INT. RXv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(4). The computation of years and hours of
service is essentially the same for vesting purposes as for participation. Act §203(b)(2); Act
§1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(5); see text accompanying notes
171-174 supra.
Although plan amendments are allowed by the Act, a participant's nonforfeitable right
to his accrued benefits must not be diminished thereby. Moreover, if a plan is amended, all
employees with 5 or more years of service must be given the option to have their vested
percentage of accrued benefits computed as if the amendment had not been adopted. Act
§203(c)(1); Act §1012(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §411(a)(10).
225. See Act §§303-04; Act 1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§412(d), (e).
The Act's funding standards require the retirement of unfunded obligations by equal annual
amortization payments. The amortization periods differ according to the source of the unfunded liability. Such periods may be extended up to 10 additional years by the Secretary of
Labor on a case-by-case basis. Act §304(a); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §412(e). See text accompanying notes 258-260 infra for a discussion of funding variances.
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be inadequate, the Secretary of Labor may prescribe alternative methods
of vesting.226 It should be noted that petitions for a variance must be filed
22 7
no later than two years after the PRA's enactment.
Because the vesting schedules required by the Act are not designed to
allow highly mobile employees such as engineers and defense industry workers to achieve parity with their more stable counterparts, a special provision
was enacted to allow a means of faster vesting without violating the prohibition against discrimination. This section permits highly mobile employees
who participate in defined benefit plans to take reduced benefits in exchange
2 28
for more rapid vesting.
All in all, the vesting and accrual provisions of the Act should help to
assure that "employees with long years of employment [will not lose] anticipated retirement benefits." Certainly, the vesting and accrual rules disallow the dubious practice of delaying tangible pension rights so as to avoid
granting them altogether should a worker be dismissed or quit at 60 rather
than 65. Even a 100 percent vested right to the maximum accrued benefit,
however, will not make for a secure retirement if the pension fund is insolvent when the employee retires.
FUNDING

CONGRESSIONAL FINDING: [O]wing to the inadequacy of current minimum
standards,the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate
2 29
funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered.

While private pensions are now widely regarded as deferred compensation, there is no assurance that employers will be able to satisfy pension obligations on a pay-as-you-go basis. 230 Sound policy, as well as tax incentives,
would dictate the establishment of a trust fund as a pool for the gradual
accretion of assets to meet these debts. Unfortunately, the accretion rates
2
have not always kept pace with increasing and often unforeseen liabilities. 31
232
In some cases, the unfunded obligations
of pension plans represent 40
or 50 percent, or even more, of the employer's net worth.233 Congress
226. Act §§207, 1012(c).
227. Id.
228. Act §1012(b), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §401(a)(5).
229. Act §2(a).
230. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
231. Liabilities may increase if amendments to a plan provide for larger pensions or for
more rapid vesting or accrual. Where such amendments come about through union demands
in collective bargaining, the increased liabilities would be unexpected. Similarly, an increase
in the number of employees covered under the plan, an unexpected number of early retirements, or other increases in employee turnover could render the plan less than adequately funded. In addition, declining stock and other security values can decrease the
plan's assets, thereby effecting an increase in its liabilities.
232. These obligations would include, for example, past service costs (see note 30 supra,
12), increased liabilities (see note 243 infra) and experience losses (see note 244 infra).
233. Western Union's unfunded pension obligations equal 46% of the company's net
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recognized the threat this situation posed to retirement security. Consequently, both Title I and Title II now require that every defined benefit plan
satisfy certain funding standards calculated to amortize past unfunded liabilities as well as to defray current costs. Even if a plan should later lose its
2 4
tax-qualified status, it must still meet the funding standards. 3
It is through these standards that the other provisions of the Act are
translated into dollars. The PRA's minimum funding requirements represent
a significant cost increase to many employers whose plans are subject to the
standard.23 5 An employer must now begin to amortize the portion of his
plan that, under prior law, was allowed to be unfunded. Also, the current
costs that he must satisfy each year will be higher, for the plan will have to
cover more employees. In addition, employee benefits will accrue and become
nonforfeitable more rapidly than before. The Act's impact on defined benefit
23 6
plans will in many cases be dramatic.
One example of this impact on most employers is larger service costs.
The normal service cost for any particular year is the portion of future
pension benefits and administrative expenses assigned to that year under
the plan's actuarial cost method. 237 This amount must be contributed currently by the employer. Past service costs, on the other hand, are the amounts
of liability in excess of plan assets existing at the time the plan was established, plus any other unfunded prior costs. 238 For example, if at a plan's
inception an employee were deemed to have already accrued a certain percentage of his eventual benefit, that amount would be a past service cost. 235
Before the PRA, the minimum contribution an employer could make to a
qualified plan in any year was an amount sufficient to cover the portion
of eventual pension obligations arising from employees' service in that year
plus interest on the unfunded past service costs. 240 Now, under the PRA's
general rule 2 41 he must contribute the year's normal service costs, plus an
amortized portion of past service costs, 242 increased liabilities, 243 and "exworth. The figure for Bethlehem Steel is 53% and for Uniroyal, "an astounding 86%."
FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 78.

234. Act §302; Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §412.
235. Plans excepted from the Act's minimum funding standards include the following
under Title I: employee welfare (as opposed to pension) plans; insurance contract plans;
plans to which employers make no contributions; plans providing payments to retired
partners under §736 of the Internal Revenue Code; individual retirement accounts or retirement bonds; defined benefit plans to the extent they are treated as individual account
plans; and excess benefit plans. Act §§301(a), '(b). Under Title 11, all plans other than
qualified pension trusts, qualified annuity plans, and qualified bond purchase plans are
excluded from coverage, in addition to those listed above. Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§412(a), (h), (i).
236. See generally Lindquist, supra note 5, at 875.
237. Act §3(28); see note 36 supra.

238. Act §3(30).
239. Id.
240. TREAs. REG. §1.401-6(c)(2)(iii).
241. Act §302; Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§412(a), (b).
242. Past service costs are unfunded past service liabilities. Act §3(30). For plans in
existence on Jan. 1, 1974, the amortization period is 40 years. For new plans, the amortiza-
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perience losses,"244 reduced by an amortized portion of decreased pension
liabilities 24,- and "experience gains. ' ' 24 6 To facilitate accounting for these
contributions by the employer and enforcement of the requirements by the
Government, the plan must establish a funding standard account.2 47 If at
the end of any plan year the balance in the account falls below zero- in
other words, if the employer's contribution, when added to all other credits2 8
for that year, is less than the charges against the account - 9 - the account has
an accumulated funding deficiency25 ° on which a five percent excise tax is
imposed.251 If the employer fails to correct the deficiency within the correc-

tion period is 30 years (40 for multi-employer plans). Act §§302(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii); Act §1013(a),
to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§412(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A plan's initial past service
cost is the excess of pension liabilities arising from employees' service prior to adoption of
the plan (or to imposition of the funding standard) over the fair market value of the
plan's assets. Act §3(30).
243. An increase in liabilities may result from a current plan amendment increasing unfunded past service liability, and is amortizable over 30 years (40 years for multi-employer
plans). Act §302(b)(2)(B)(iii); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §412(b)
(2)(B)(iii); see note 231 supra.
244. An experience gain or loss is the difference between anticipated experience, e.g.,
return on investments, and the actual experience. The amortization period for these gains
and losses is 15 years (20 years for multi-employer plans). Act §§302(b)(2)(B)(iv), (3)(B)(ii);
Act §1013(a), to be codified as lNr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§412(b)(2)(B)(iv), (3)(B)(ii). Net gains
or losses resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions are amortizable over 30 years.
Act §302(b)(2)(B)(v); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§412(b)(2)
(B)(v), (3)(B1)(iii).
245.
pension
(3)(B)(i);
246.

A decrease in plan liability may result from the adoption of an amendment reducing
benefits and is amortizable over 30 years (40 for multi-employer plans). Act §302(b)
Act §1013(a), to be codified as IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §412(b)(3)(B)(i).
See note 244 supra.

247. Act §302(a)(1); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §412(a).

248. Other credits include equal amortization installments of decreases in plan liabilities,
of net experience gains, and of gains resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions; any
waived funding deficiency; and the excess of any debit balance in the funding standard account over any debit balance in the alternative funding standard account, if in the preceding year the accumulated funding deficiency was computed under the alternative
standard. Act §302(b)(3); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §412(b)(3);
see text accompanying notes 255-257 infra.
249. Charges against the funding standard account include the normal cost for the plan
year, equal installments of the amortized liabilities (see notes 242-244 supra), installments on
a 15-year amortization of each waived funding deficiency, and on a 5-year amortization of
any excess debit balance. Act §302(b)(2); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §412(b)(2).
250. Act §302(a)(1); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §412(a). An
employer contribution made within 21 2 months after the end of a plan year relates back to
the plan year. This period may be extended up to 6 additional months under regulations to
be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §412(c)(10).
251. Act §1013(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §4971(a). If the tax is not
paid, before a deficiency notice may be issued the Secretary of the Treasury must notify the
Secretary of Labor and give him a reasonable opportunity either to require the employer to
correct the deficiency or to comment on the imposition of the tax. Act §1013(b), to be
codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §4971(d).
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tion period, 252 he is assessed an additional tax equal to 100 percent of the
accumulated funding deficiency. 253 In addition to this penalty tax of 105
percent, he may also be subject to civil liability under Title I for violation
25
of the minimum funding standards. '
Plans that use funding methods that provide for a relatively fast accretion of plan assets in the early plan years may use an alternative minimum
funding standard. 255 Under this provision, a plan would continue to maintain
the regular funding standard account but would also establish an alternative
minimum funding standard account, which would be charged and credited
on a somewhat different basis, not involving amortization.256 For any plan
year, the accumulated funding deficiency would be the lesser of the deficit
2 57
in the regular account or that in the alternative account.
Congressional concern about the impact on employers of the PRA's
funding standards, and the concomitant threat to the voluntary -continuance
of pension plans, is evident in the provisions granting the Secretaries of
258
Labor and the Treasury authority to waive or to vary certain requirements.
There are, however, limitations on the discretion they may use in the exercise
252. The "correction period" is the period beginning with the end of a plan year in
which there is an accumulated funding deficiency and ending 90 days after a deficiency
notice with respect to the additional (100%) tax has been mailed. Under certain circumstances the period may be extended. Act §1013(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§4971(c)(3).
253. Act §101(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §4971(b). If this additional
tax is unpaid, the Secretary of the Treasury must again notify the Secretary of Labor. See
note 251 supra. If the Secretary of the Treasury finds that the collection is in jeopardy,
however, he may proceed without prior notice to the Labor Department. Act §3002(b).
254. Act §502(b).
255. Act §305; Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §412(g). Plans
allowed to use the alternative standard are those utilizing projected benefit cost methods
rather than accrued benefit cost methods. The accrued benefit or unit credit method
recognizes pension costs only when they have accrued; that is, when the employee service
on which the benefits are based has been rendered. Under the unit credit method, the
normal cost is the present value of the units of future benefits credited to employees for
service in that year. Thus, for an individual employee, the cost (present value) of a unit
of benefit increases each year because the length of time the contribution will earn interest
becomes shorter. Projected benefit cost methods, in contrast, look forward and assign the
entire cost of an employee's projected, or future, benefit to past, present, and future periods
not directly related to the time when the service is rendered, or when the benefits accrue to
the employee. Projected benefit cost methods include, inter alia, the entry age normal
method and the individual level premium method. For a description of the operation of
these methods, see Op. No. 8, supra note 31, at 6551-53.
256. The alternative account would be credited with the amount considered to be
contributed by the employer and charged with the sum of the following amounts: the
lesser of the normal cost computed under the plan's funding method or the normal cost
figured under the unit credit method (see note 255 supra); the excess of the present value
of accrued benefits over the fair market value of the plan assets; and the cumulative excess
of credits over charges to the alternative standard account for all prior plan years. Act §805;
Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §412(g).
257. Act §302(a)(2); Act §1013(a), to be codified as Irr. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §412(a).
258. Act §§303(a), (c), 304(a); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§§412(b), (c).
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of that authority. Waivers are to be granted only where necessary because of
substantial business hardship259 and where application of the minimum funding standard would be "adverse to the interests of plan participants in the
aggregate."2 60
In line with the funding requirements, the PRA increases the deduction
limits for employer contributions. Before 1974, deductible contributions
were limited to the greater of the following: five percent of the compensation
of participating employees 2 6 1 or that amount plus a level amount of unfunded
past liabilities amortized over the remaining future service of the employees
whose benefits comprise the liabilities 262 ("level cost" limit); or the normal
cost of the plan plus 10 percent of the unfunded past liabilities2 63 ("normal
cost" limit). The PRA repeals the five percent limitation and provides instead a deduction for any amount an employer must contribute to meet
the minimum funding standards. 264 In addition, the Act retains the "level
cost" limit265 and alters the "normal cost" limit to provide for 10-year

amortization of unfunded liabilities2M; rather than the 10 percent interest
payment, which, of course, would never retire the unfunded portion.
The PRA's funding provisions will create the most critical hardship for
plans that were already severely underfunded.27 To be sure, it will be some-

what more expensive to fund any pension plan that comes within the purview of the Act. One may ask, then, whether the PRA, with its increased
coverage and strict funding requirements, may prove to be the straw that
will break the back of the private pension. Even Professor Bernstein2 68 has
been quoted recently as voicing reservations:
Private pensions had a terrific vogue during the Fifties and Sixties
because they were built on the bull market. .

.

. Lacking that kind

of fuel, I doubt whether
prefunded pensions are viable in a period of
2 9

double-digit inflation.. 6

It would appear certain that the PRA's funding standards will assure
solvent pension plans when the time comes for retirement benefits to be
259.

Act §303(b); Act §1013(a), to be codified as

INT.

REv. CODE

OF

1954, §412(d)(2).

Factors to be considered in determining substantial business hardship include but are not
limited to whether the employer is operating at an economic loss, whether there is substantial unemployment or underemployment in the trade or business and in the industry
concerned, whether the sales and profits of the industry concerned are depressed or declining, and whether it is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the
waiver is granted. Id.
260. Act §303(a); Act §1013(a), to be codified as INT. REV. Acr OF 1954, §412(d)(I).
261. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(A).
262. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(B).
263. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(C).
264. Act §1013(c), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(l)(A)(i).
265. Act §1013(c), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(A)(ii).
266. Act §1013(c), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(1)(A)(iii).
267. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
268. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
269.

FORTUNE, Jan.

1975, at 79.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 9
1975]

PENSION REFORM ACT

paid. If a fund is able to accumulate sufficient assets to meet accumulated
liabilities, it is by definition solvent. The fundamental question, therefore,
is whether employers will be able to satisfy these standards or whether
section 302 of the PRA sounds the beginning of the end for defined benefit
plans. Although the answer would require clairvoyance, at least one commentator has suggested that, where the employer has any choice in the
matter, it would be imprudent to elect a defined benefit plan.2 7 0 But assuming
defined benefit plans are able to withstand these onerous funding requirements, the participation, accrual, and vesting standards should become meaningful bulwarks of retirement security.
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT

ACCOUNTS27 1

Although a private pension plan is an essential component in the retirement scheme for millions of American workers, many others must depend
solely on Social Security and personal savings for old-age stability. For these
individuals, pre-Act tax law was simply a stumbling block on the unmarked
road to a comfortable senescence. 27 2 While their tax dollars may have in270. Lindquist, supra note 5, at 875.
271. The reader should be aware that, although not specifically treated by this section,
individual retirement annuities and retirement bonds each offer viable alternatives for retirement planning. Like individual retirement accounts, retirement annuities and retirement
bonds operate on the assumption that the participant is not presently covered by a qualified
plan but is nevertheless interested in providing for old-age security with before-tax dollars.
Individual retirement annuities and retirement bonds basically offer the same favorable tax
features as retirement accounts and must meet most of the same requirements. Their single
substantive difference, therefore, would appear to be the conduit through which retirement
funds are invested, involving the use of either a trust, an annuity, or a governmental bond,
and the partidpant's views with respect to the relative merits of each as an investment
medium. See generally Act §§2002(a), (b), (c), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§219,
408, 409 respectively, for regulation of individual retirement annuities and retirement bonds.
272. For members of this class, there were few avenues to retirement security. Limited
to investment of after-tax dollars, usually in low-interest savings accounts, they were then
taxed on the interest as it was earned. Such individuals were thus doubly disadvantaged.
The following figures may help to illustrate.
Assume that A and B have the same amount of taxable income with a top marginal rate
of 40%; that A participates in a qualified plan and that B's employer has no such plan;
that both A's qualified pension trust and B's savings account are able to earn at an annual
rate of 5%; and finally that at retirement, the taxable income of each will be reduced to an
amount with a top marginal rate of 25%.
Year 1
Annual contribution
Less tax at 40%

A

B

$1,000
0

$1,000
400

Available for investment
Earnings at 5%
Less tax at 40%

1,000
50
0

600
s0
12

Net gain on investment
Total value of fund

50
1,050

18
618

0

$ 412

Total tax paid year 1
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directly aided the retirement incomes of individuals covered by qualified
plans, they reaped none of the benefits attributable to the extraordinary
taxing principles of qualified trusts. 273 To assuage this inequity, Congress
developed the individual retirement account (IRA).2 7 4 In effect, the IRA

allows for substantially the same tax treatment of private savings as a
qualified trust provides for pension funds.
In contrast to a qualified trust, however, contributions to an IRA must
normally be filtered through the participant's own tax form before becoming
available for investment. Payments to an IRA will result in an above-the-line
deduction from gross income, 2 75 provided the account is established in compliance with the Act. The initial requirement of an IRA is that it must be
a trust created for the exclusive benefit of the participant or his beneficiaries27'
with a bank serving as trustee.2 7 7 Annual contributions (except in the case
of rollovers)275 must be in cash and are strictly limited to the lesser of
$1,500 or 15 percent of yearly income.2 7 9 An identical ceiling is placed on

Year 2
$1,000
0
1,000
1,050

Annual contribution
Less tax at 40%
Net current contribution
Previous balance in fund

$1,000
400
600
618

Available for investment
Earnings at 5%
Less tax at 40%

2,050
102.50
0

1,218
60.90
24.36

Net gain on investment
Total value of fund
Total tax paid year 2

102.50
2,152.50
$
0

36.54
1,254.54
S 424.36

Tax on distribution, Year N, at 25%
Total tax paid
Total contributions
Total available at retirement

$ 538.13

$

538.13
2,000.00
S1,614.37

0
836.36
2,000.00
S1,254.54

273. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
274. Act §§2002(a), (b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§219, 408.
275. Act §2002(a)(2), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §219(a)(2).
276. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(a).
277. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(2). The Act provides
that the Secretary of the Treasury may authorize a person other than a bank to serve as
trustee if he can demonstrate a capability to administer the trust in compliance with the
rules governing an IRA. Id.
278. See note 296 infra and accompanying text.

279. Act §2002(b), to be codified as

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §408(a)(l). Compare $7,500

or 15% of income ceiling placed on contributions to H.R. 10 plans. See note 64 supra. No
apparent justification exists for this discrepancy other than a congressional effort to encourage
the establishment of a Keogh plan where an owner-employee might be considering excluding
his employees and adopting an IRA for his sole benefit. Nonetheless, this is a rather
spurious reason for penalizing the many individuals unable to participate in a qualified plan
and who are not even in a proprietary status. Clearly, the IRA's $1,500 or 15% of income
ceiling should be raised so as to more nearly reflect the similarity between an owner-employee
and a potential IRA participant.
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annual deductions.20 Should the participant exceed these yearly limitations,
either inadvertently or by design, such excess contributions will be subject
to a six percent penalty tax to be paid by the participant. 28 ' An individual
may avoid this tax, however, by withdrawing both the excess payments and
corresponding investment yields prior to the timely filing of his income tax
return for the year in which they were made. 282 No deductions will be allowed for contributions to an IRA if during the same year an individual was
covered by and participated in any other qualified pension plan. 283 Further,
to ensure that such accounts are used for retirement purposes, no deductions
will be allowed for payments by an individual who has attained the age
of 70O228 and, correspondingly, the entire interest in the account must be
distributed by that age or, in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, over the life or lives (or for a term certain
not exceeding the lives) of the participant and his or her spouse. 28 5 Special
provision is made for the death of the participant or spouse prior to final
distribution of the account assets. 288 Finally, while distribution may commence at any time following the participant's attainment of age 59y, regardless of whether he continues to work, if account funds are distributed
prior to that point, a 10 percent excise tax will be levied on such amounts. 28 7
The Act provides that no part of an IRA may be invested in a life
insurance contract 8 8 or commingled with other property, except in a common
trust or investment fund.28 9 Otherwise, account assets may be invested in
much the same way as assets of a qualified trust including, but not limited
to, the purchase of annuity contracts, savings accounts, or stocks of a mutual
0

fund.29.

280. Act §2002(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §219(b)(1). Of course, the
$1,500 or 15% of yearly income limit on deductions for and contributions to an IRA is
merely a ceiling. Participants may deduct and contribute lesser amounts at their discretion.
See id.; Act §2002(b), to be codified as INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(1).
281. Act §2002(d), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§4973(a), (b).
282. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF -1954, §408(d)(4). Reclaimed
excess contributions will not be includible in gross income for the subsequent year although,
of course, they will be disallowed as deductions in the year When made. Any net income
attributable to and distributed with the excess contributions is to be included in the participant's income for the year in which it was received. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 130 (1974).
283. Act §2002(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §219(b)(2).
284. Act §2002(a), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §219(b)(3).
285. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(6).
286. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(7).
287. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(f. This penalty tax will
be in addition to the normal income tax assessed on such amounts as the result of its inclusion in gross income for the year received. Id.
288. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(3). This prohibition
is to ensure that contributions to an IRA are, in fact, for the purpose of creating a pension.
"The individual retirement account is to be used to provide retirement income and life
insurance is an asset designed for a different purpose - to provide funds for survivors." H.R.
REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1974).
289. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §408(a)(5).
290. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1974).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/9

38

Finley: The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Brave New World of Retirement Sec
UNIVERiSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

Generally, the investment earnings of an IRA will be exempt from taxa29 2
however,
tion. 291 Should the account engage in a prohibited transaction,

the Act presumes a constructive distribution of all account assets, with a corresponding tax on an amount equal to their fair market value.293 An employer
may establish an IRA for his employees if the trust satisfies all the requirements for such accounts and if the employer maintains a separate account
for the interests of each employee or member.2 94 Employer contributions to
such accounts must be included in the employees' gross income, although
2 95
they are then subject to subsequent deduction.
A significant feature of the PRA's treatment of individual retirement
accounts is the rollover provisions for tax-free transfers from an IRA or
qualified trust into a different account. Congress recognized that, from time to
time, an employee will move and wish to establish a new IRA in a different
locale. Therefore, distributions out of an IRA to the participant will not be
considered gross income if. within 60 days following distribution, the entire
amount received (both money and property) is transferred to another IRA.2 ,13
The Act's provisions for individual retirement accounts clearly represent
a long-awaited and badly needed tax break for individuals not covered by
qualified plans.2 97 Through a relatively uncomplicated process, these people
may now save for retirement with before-tax dollars. Unfortunately, these
novel benefits do not now seem to be widely known. It would therefore be
helpful if interested banks not currently publicizing the plans and the
Government itself would engage in an educational campaign to acquaint

291.

Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(c).

292.
293.

See text accompanying notes 112-114 supra.
Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE

294.

Id.

OF

1954, §408(c).

295. Act §2002(a), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §219(a).
296. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §408(d)(3). This provision
shall apply only once every 3 years. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§408(d)(3)(B).
Alternatively, if the entire amount received from the IRA is attributable solely to an
earlier rollover from a qualified trust or annuity and such amount represents the total assets

of the account, the funds so received may be transferred to a qualified trust or annuity
without including them in gross; income. Act §2002(b), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §408(d)(3). Once again, the entire transaction must take place within 60 days. Id.
Moreover, lump sum distributions from qualified trusts and annuities need not be included
as gross income if transferred into an IRA or qualified trust within 60 days of receipt. Act

§2002(g)(5), to be codified as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §402(a)(5).
297. For instance, assuming a 6% return on investment, contributions to an IRA of
$1,500 a year for 30 years would result in a net retirement fund of S118,587. In contrast, and
because earnings of normal savings accounts are taxable, the same $1,500 a year payments
into a savings account earning 6% interest would, after 30 years, result only in retirement
savings of $68,633 if the contributing individual were in a 25% tax bracket. More dramatic
still would be the case of an individual who follows the same procedure of saving in a
normal account but who is in a 50% tax bracket. For him, a contribution of $1,500 a year
for 30 years would net only $35,682. See Orlando (Fla.) Sentinel, Feb. 16, 1975, §A at 25,
col. 1. An IRA will certainly enhance retirement income for those individuals participating
in one.
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potential IRA participants with the substantial gains to be derived from
this type of investment.
CONCLUSION

The PRA is a noble piece of legislation. It is the product of an American
compassion for the often-forgotten victims of the fear, isolation, and poverty
attendant upon old age. Its taxing provisions are for the protection of people,
not just revenue. Its regulatory provisions are not punitive, but preventive.
And its insurance provisions are not a penalty, but a pledge of retirement
security.
Unfortunately, for all its good intentions, the PRA may be a white
elephant: it looks big and strong, but will it work? The prohibitive cost factors
may be insurmountable. The avalanche of paperwork, the threat of excise
taxes, the rigor of funding standards, and the possibility, however remote,
of corporate liquidation may converge and backfire, discouraging employers
from ever establishing or maintaining pension plans. It has been suggested,
therefore, that private pensions are not the ultimate answer; rather, it is
said, retirement income should be provided through a system of public pensions such as Social Security, based on the federal taxing power. 298 Perhaps
this would be a viable alternative, considering the duplication of efforts involved in maintaining both public and private systems. Still, the Pension
Reform Act may remedy the current inequities existing in private pension
plans. And, perhaps most importantly, for the first time all private pension
law has been pulled together into a unified whole -the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
KAY G. FINLEY
MERuR-r A. GARDNER
298.

R. NADER & K. BLAcKWELL, supra note 15, at 122-28; FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at 78.
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